(Image credit:
Peggy Marco, Pixabay)
Today, I shall return to discussing the ideas, which have led
me to create my own system of political philosophy. My subject, on this
occasion, will be ethics: “the branch of knowledge that deals with moral
principles.”
Looked at from the outside, ethics is a strange
discipline. The subject matter is simple: What is right for us human beings to
do, and what is wrong? And why? Yet, when you look at academic papers on ethics,
or even at the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, things rapidly become
muddy.
Ethical schools
Ethics today has many different tendencies. First, there
are virtue ethicists, who see right and wrong in terms of the presence or
absence (or somewhere in between) of elements from some laundry-list of
virtues. Aristotle, one of the very first ethicists, was among them.
Second, there are deontologists or rule ethicists, for
whom right acts are distinguished by adherence to a set of rules or obligations.
Immanuel Kant was among the foremost of them. Historically, they have divided
into religious and secular camps. But deontologists do not need to be
religious, or to incorporate principles from any religion into their list of
rules.
Among deontologists are the natural law ethicists. For these
thinkers, the source of the duties or obligations is a “natural law,” which is
the same for all those under it. Thomas Aquinas was the major natural law
ethicist of the religious camp. And John Locke had his own version of natural
law, which was independent of religion (even though he was a Christian).
Beyond these, there are consequentialists, who see right
or wrong for an act as being determined by the consequences of that act. There
are many skeins of consequentialist views, but no particular school seems to
have produced a clear champion. Utilitarianism, an early form of
consequentialism which, in the words of founder Jeremy Bentham, sought “the
greatest happiness of the greatest number,” was very influential for a time.
There are also pragmatic ethicists, who reject any idea of
universal ethical principles or natural law. And rights ethicists, who see
ethics in terms of human rights and freedoms.
My own approach to ethics
My views have their roots in the ideas of John Locke. So, I come
to ethics from a natural law perspective. That makes me, in the first instance,
a deontologist or obligations ethicist. But I also seek to incorporate elements
of rights ethics, and even virtue ethics, into my system.
The identity determines morality principle
Because I am agnostic in religion, my ethical philosophy does
not require a deity or law-giver. Instead, I posit that the natural law for
human beings is determined by human nature.
I derive this from a more general principle, which I call
“identity determines morality.” I state this as: “Right and wrong behaviours
for a species of sentient beings are determined by the nature of the species.” As
evidence for this, I invite you to observe the behaviours of different animal
species living side-by-side in the same environment, such as waterfowl around a
lake. Their behaviours have a similar core, but each species has its own particular
variations too.
Thus, for me, any species of sentient beings, including
humans, has its own natural law, defining what is right and wrong for members
of the species to do.
The ethical equality principle
An immediate follow-up to the identity determines morality
principle is what I call the ethical equality principle. I state it as follows:
“Among members of the same species, what is right for one to do, is right for
another to do under similar circumstances, and vice versa.” This tallies
with the Enlightenment idea of the rule of law. In which everyone, whether in
government or not, must obey the same rules.
Last month, I wrote about the Westphalian state, which was designed
by 16th-century Frenchman Jean Bodin, and under which we still
suffer. How well does this state, with its sovereign and subjects, conform to
the ethical equality principle? …Not well at all. It directly contradicts the
idea of ethical equality! For it lets the sovereign do things, which the
subjects may not. And the sovereign is not responsible for the consequences of
what it does.
The natural law of humanity
A few weeks ago, I outlined my views on human nature. It is
natural for us to take control of our surroundings, to use them for our
benefit, and to leave our mark on them. And it is natural to us to use our
faculties of reason, to seek to understand what we see around us and what we
experience. Moreover, it is natural for us to form ourselves into social
groups, and to organize them in such a way as to bring benefits to everyone in
them. By doing this, we build civilizations, which provide the habitat in which
we human beings can live our lives to the full. And in that habitat, we
interact with each other using Franz Oppenheimer’s economic means, and seek to
co-operate to take control of our surroundings.
The ethical obligations which enable this, I call the natural law of humanity. This law obliges us to behave in ways that make us fit to be lived with, and so fit to take part in civilizations. In my view, right behaviour for any human being is convivial, civilized behaviour.
Because the natural law of humanity consists of obligations,
and those obligations are the same for everyone, it can, in principle, be codified. I call
this list of obligations (once it has been written!) the Convivial Code. I
shall say more about that code in my next essay.
My view has a flip side, too. Those that, persistently or in
large matters, fail to behave up to the obligations of the natural law of
humanity, are failing to behave as human beings. Should we not, therefore,
consider that they may not be, in actuality, human beings? That
the “ugly duckling,” that neither walks nor quacks like a duck, might not be a
duck at all?
My views on other
ethical approaches
Virtue ethics
Having been trained as a mathematician, I like to quantify
things if I can. And I find virtues difficult to judge in a quantitative way.
It is all very well to say that, for example, “courage” or “moderation” is
virtuous. But just how courageous, or how moderate, a particular action
is in a particular situation, seems to be a movable feast. I find it far easier
to judge actions (and, where necessary, motives) according to rules, as
the deontologist does.
That said, if I find that I can convert a particular virtue
into an obligation or set of obligations, I can incorporate that virtue into my
system, by merging those obligations in to my list.
Consequentialism
I find consequentialism, as the basis of an ethical system,
unsatisfying. For, in many practical situations, we do not have enough
information to judge the consequences of an action ahead of time. This makes it impossible to judge, before acting, whether the action is right or not.
Consequentialists also like to use thought experiments with
questionable assumptions built into them. For example, the “trolley problem” [[1]]
seems to assume that five lives are always of greater value than one. Even if
one of those five was, for example, a young Adolf Hitler.
There is one concession, which I do make to the consequentialists.
When proven damage has been unjustly caused to someone by voluntary action of
another, and that damage could reasonably have been foreseen to result from
that action, I see the perpetrator as under an obligation to compensate the
victim(s). In this case, if the evidence of damage is clear enough, it should
be possible to quantify it. And a rule or set of rules, such as the Romans used
in cases of theft and fraud, should be able to map damage to compensation.
Utilitarianism
I find utilitarianism anathema, because it seeks to maximize
the total good, not the good of each individual. It therefore may “justify”
small numbers of innocent individuals suffering huge losses, while benefiting a
much larger number of people. As an individualist, I follow John Locke’s
definition of the public good: “the good of every particular member of that
society, as far as by common rules it can be provided for.” So, I can’t accept
such outcomes.
Pragmatic ethics
Pragmatic ethics is also anathema to me. This is because it
rejects the possibility of ethical principles which are independent of culture, so denies
the existence of a natural law of humanity. Yet, it does not supply any
evidence to back up this denial.
Rights and obligations
I see human rights and freedoms as extremely important.
Indeed, when I try to list detailed obligations to be included in the natural
law of humanity, I place respecting the rights and freedoms of all those, who
respect the equal rights and freedoms of others, at the very top of my list.
In my view of ethics, valid human rights or freedoms can
always be mapped into obligations which, when obeyed by everyone, will deliver
those rights or freedoms to all those who respect them for others. The reverse
is true, too. If everyone around an individual keeps to the obligations which make
up the natural law of humanity, then that individual will enjoy the rights and
freedoms, which correspond to those obligations.
I call this process, of mapping between rights and
obligations, “back-to-backing.”
Examples of back-to-backing
In simple cases, a right can be directly linked to a single
obligation. For example, the right against slavery can be back-to-backed with
the obligation “Do not hold anyone in bondage.”
Similarly, an obligation can be back-to-backed with a
corresponding right. The Christian “Thou shalt not kill,” or “Do not murder,”
for example, maps to the right to life.
But this mapping isn’t always one-to-one. For example, to
deliver to those around them the right to security of person, individuals need
to refrain from carrying out several different criminal acts. Which include violent
aggression, rape and paedophilia.
Practical limitations and exceptions
One problem with viewing ethics in terms of lists of
obligations is that it isn’t always practical to keep to the obligations with
absolute strictness. For example, to include an absolute prohibition on
physical violence would be impractical, because it would not allow those under
attack to defend themselves. Each obligation must, therefore, also specify the
conditions under which individuals may reasonably break it, and at what level.
I identify two sets of circumstances, which can generally justify acts
that deviate from ethical obligations. These are self-defence against
aggression, and defence of others against aggression.
To allow these as reasons to deviate in certain situations
answers many of the tricks, that philosophers like to bring up as apparent
counter-examples to ethical principles. For example, the natural law of
humanity will require you to be truthful and honest in all your dealings with
others. But if someone you suspect of wanting to harm your neighbour asks you
where he has gone for the week-end, it can be OK to lie in your neighbour’s
defence, and say that you don’t know. This would, however, not be OK if you
have specifically undertaken to tell the truth in the matter, for example in a
court of law.
False claims of pseudo-rights
Today, we hear from certain quarters claims to “rights,”
that seem to have something wrong about them. A “right to a stable climate” and
a “right not to be offended” are cases in point.
Recently, I discovered that both these “rights” can quite
easily be shown to be false. Ask the question: What obligation or obligations
would guarantee this “right” for everyone, if I, and everyone else, kept to
them? If that question has no answer, so that the “right” cannot be
back-to-backed with one or more obligations, then the “right” claimed must be
false, because nothing anyone can do can deliver it.
For the touted “right to a stable climate,” it is a fact
that the Earth’s climate, historically, has been variable. It has changed in
major ways, completely independently of human activities; for example, in the
Roman and Mediaeval warm periods, and the Little Ice Age. So, no obligation or
obligations of any kind, entered into by any number of humans, could possibly
stabilize the climate completely.
For the claim of a general “right not to be offended,” ask:
How can anyone know what precisely will offend a particular individual, whom
they have not met before? And as long as you keep to the obligations which make
up the natural law of humanity, how can any human being reasonably be offended by
anything you do?
Those, that press false claims of rights such as these, are
in my view themselves violating the natural law of humanity.
Human rights
By a human right, I mean a right common to all convivial
human beings. (I exclude from this definition what I call contractual rights,
which arise out of contracts voluntarily made with others).
Who has human rights?
The 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (just
about the only half-way good thing the UN ever did) says – rightly – the
following. “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms… without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.”
Thus, a human right accrues to every human being without
exception, subject only to the individual behaving as a human being. That is, keeping
to his or her obligations under the natural law of humanity.
This may be summarized in three statements. First, you
should judge others, not on the basis of who they are, but by what they do.
Judge them by their actions, and where necessary, what you can discern about
their motivations. I call this “judgement by behaviour.”
Second, human rights are earned. You earn your human rights
by behaving as a human being. That is, by obeying the natural law of humanity,
including respecting others’ human rights.
Third, human rights, once earned, are sacrosanct. If you
behave as a human being, and respect the human rights of others, no-one may justly
violate your human rights.
Classification of valid human rights
Over the centuries, many lists of human rights have been
constructed. From Magna Carta of 1215, via the 1689 English Bill of Rights and
the 1791 US Bill of Rights, to the UN declaration, to the European Convention
on Human Rights.
These lists contain four types of valid human rights. First,
there are fundamental rights. These result from obligations, which apply to
everyone, to refrain from doing something. The associated obligations have the
form “Do not...” followed by something bad.
Second, there are rights of non-impedance. These result from
more nuanced obligations, of the form: “Do not put any obstacle in the way
of...” followed by something good. Rights of non-impedance always carry an
implied rider: “...provided it does not violate your, or anyone else’s,
rights.”
Third, there are procedural rights. These rights, such as
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, must guide the procedures
used in confrontational situations. And in particular, the relations between
government and the people it is supposed to serve.
The fourth class, and perhaps the most difficult to
characterize, I call expectations. These result from obligations that positively
require you to behave in a convivial and civilized way. For example, to be
truthful and honest in all your dealings. An expectation is, in a sense, not
quite as strong as a right, because everyone makes mistakes. But those, that without
good reason fail to live up to reasonable expectations, are nevertheless breaking
the natural law of humanity.
Misguided “rights”
There is a fifth group of supposed “rights,” which I label
“misguided.” They are misguided, because they cannot be delivered without
violating the rights of other individuals. For example, an indiscriminate right
to “social security” requires some people to be forced to pay for things that
bring benefit to others, not to them.
Most of these misguided “rights,” however, can quite easily
be re-formulated into rights of non-impedance. Social security, for example,
becomes the right not to be prevented from insuring against, or associating
with others for protection against, economic hardship. And the supposed right
to work turns into the right not to be impeded in trading with others in
whatever way is mutually acceptable.
To sum up
My ethical philosophy can be summed up in the following eight
statements:
1)
Identity determines morality. Right and
wrong behaviours for a species of sentient beings are determined by the nature
of the species.
2)
Ethical equality. Among members of the
same species, what is right for one to do, is right for another to do under
similar circumstances, and vice versa.
3)
The natural law of humanity. There exists
a list of ethical obligations, which represent the behaviours natural to human
beings. This can be codified.
4)
Back-to-backing. Human rights and
obligations can be “back-to-backed,” so that one or more rights can be enjoyed
if everyone satisfies one or more obligations.
5)
Practical limitations. Self-defence and
defence of others can be valid reasons for breaking the natural law of
humanity.
6)
Judgement by behaviour. You should judge
others, not by who they are, but by what they do.
7)
Human rights are earned. You earn your
human rights by behaving as a human being.
8) Earned human rights are sacrosanct. If you behave as a human being, no-one may justly violate your human rights.
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