Monday, 8 April 2024

The Back-story behind Anti-Car Policies in the UK, Part Two: The story up to 2008

This is the second of a set of six planned essays. Together, they will document the back-story behind the anti-car policies, which have plagued the people of the UK, under governments of all parties, for the last 30 years and more.

In the first essay, I examined the facts of air pollution. I looked at the major “smog” and “haze” incidents, for which there is objective evidence of serious harms to human health having been caused by air pollution. I began with the London “Great Smog” of 1952. I then reviewed the other major reported events. I found that virtually all the smog and haze events, which had proven and serious health consequences, involved the presence in the pollution mix of significant quantities of both particulate matter (PM) and sulphur oxides (sulphur dioxide, SO2 and/or sulphur trioxide, SO3). Many also had unusual meteorological conditions: low wind, stagnant air, or even a temperature inversion.

In this, the second essay, I will start to explore the history of the air pollution issue. Today, I will take it from the beginnings of the green agenda in the early 1970s, through to the year 2008.

I chose 2008 as the end point, because 2009 marks a watershed over this issue. In that year, the UK government’s Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollution (COMEAP) produced a report. Which laid a “scientific” foundation that enabled government and campaigners to make out that air pollution was a much more serious problem than had previously been thought. I will cover that report in the third essay of the set.

The United Nations

The green agenda began in the early 1970s, and its main driver was the United Nations. Having themselves been fuelled by the green agenda, the anti-car policies we suffer under today also have their roots around that time.

Now, the UN was started with high hopes. At the beginning, it did do some good work. Notably, the UN Declaration of Human Rights was a high-minded aim; though its execution left a lot to be desired. But after that, the UN began to decay.

Today, despite the image it seeks to project of benevolence, incorruptibility and justified authority, the UN is in reality an undemocratic and unaccountable political player. It has been made into a weapon by those that do not have in mind the interests of the ordinary people of the world. It is the driving force behind the deep green agenda, that has sought increasingly to restrict human civilization. And today, it aims to take these agendas so far as to destroy individual freedom and human prosperity.

Maurice Strong

The Canadian former oil baron, Maurice Strong, was the individual that, more than anyone else, perverted the UN into a bureaucracy intent on destroying human civilization, and in particular Western industrial civilization.

Indeed, I rate Strong as the evillest man of the 20th century. Ahead, indeed, of Stalin, Mao, Hitler and Pol Pot. Those four all set out to commit genocides against particular racial, religious, social or economic groups. But Strong set out to commit genocide against our entire civilization. He gave this away in a 1997 magazine interview, in which he said: “Frankly, we may get to the point where the only way of saving the world will be for industrial civilization to collapse.” Over several decades, Strong influenced those around him in the UN, including those at the very top, to move towards provoking that collapse.

The 1970s

Early stirrings

It was in 1971 that the UN started its “Man and the Biosphere” programme. This programme is still going on today! Coincidentally, or perhaps not, this was also the year in which Klaus Schwab’s World Economic Forum (WEF) was founded.

In 1972, the UN held its “Conference on the Human Environment” in Stockholm. And founded the UN Environment Programme, under the directorship of Maurice Strong.

The role of the European élites

While the UN continued to be the driver for much of the green agenda, including the “climate change” scam, the European political élites soon got involved, too. And air pollution was one of the major issues, with which they planned to beat us over the head and take away our prosperity and our freedoms.

This most interesting document [[1]], written in the mid-2000s by Christian Hey, Secretary General of the German Advisory Council on the Environment, relates some of the early history. The European Council and European Commission decided in 1972 to “establish a Community environmental policy.” The moves towards instituting such a policy began in 1973, with the first Environmental Action Programme or EAP. It is interesting to note also that the UK’s Royal College of Physicians (RCP), by its own account, issued its first report on air pollution and health in 1972.

On January 1st, 1973, the UK formally joined what was then known as the “European Communities.” This put us on the road to being ruled over by the unaccountable tyranny, that later became the EU.

Air pollution as a global issue

It was also in 1973 that air pollution started to become a policy issue around the world. Monitoring of two pollutants, ozone and nitrogen dioxide, began in the USA.

Monitoring of PM2.5 (particles of matter 2.5 micrometres or less in diameter) had already begun there back in 1959. These particles are considered important in the toxicology of air pollution, because they are small enough, that they can be expected to get through the body’s defences into the lungs, and potentially cause adverse health effects.

Also in 1973, the UN’s International Maritime Organization held an International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.

In the remainder of the 1970s, the main focus in the scientific area of air pollution and health was monitoring. The mortality data collection for what later became the California Cancer Prevention Study began in 1973, thus allowing comparison of PM2.5 levels with actual mortality. And data collection for what became the Six Cities Study began in 1974.

The 1980s and up to Rio

The politicization of air pollution

In contrast to the 1970s, links between air pollution and health became in the 1980s more and more a political matter. And it was the European Community that did this. They changed their Environmental Action Programmes to be more directed towards control of emissions. And their desire to create the Internal Market or Single Market led to pressures to “harmonize” product regulations and environmental emissions standards between countries.

It was during the 1980s, too, that the idea of ambitious “clean air” policies, requiring reductions of emissions from cars as well as from other emissions sources, was first mooted. It was the Germans that were primarily responsible for this. So, policies designed to appease green interests in Germany were to be imposed, not just on Germans, but on people in other European countries, too – whether they wanted them or not.

This meant, of course, abandoning all idea of democracy or self-determination for the people, in the UK and in other EC countries. Did it not? If people in the UK had become aware of that at the time, I suspect Brexit would have happened a lot earlier than it eventually did.

It is ironic that the rise of those green interests in Germany, and so of “clean air” policies, had come out of the so-called Waldsterben, or forest die-back, that had become a big issue there in the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, though, it had become apparent that Waldsterben was not in any way a new problem. That it had had a variety of causes, including (and perhaps mainly) bark beetles. And that air pollution, except maybe a little from sulphur dioxide from communist industries, was not a big factor. Yet nothing was done to reverse, or even to soften, these policies, even though all rationale for them had been lost. This was atrocious conduct, typical of the arrogant attitude of the political élites towards the people of Europe.

Interestingly, the UN’s 1987 report “Our Common Future” did not have much to say about cars. It railed against “acid rain” from industry, but did not seem to see cars as a big contributor to any such thing. It certainly showed no sign of any policy being mooted at that time at the UN level, to force people in developed countries out of our cars.

The proliferation of green-ism

Towards the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the European Commission became far more active in environmental matters. The primary driver of this was the “global warming” narrative, which had begun to attract much attention among the green-minded, and the Commission saw this as a way to increase its profile in so-called “régime building.” But it was applied to other perceived or potential environmental issues too.

One result was the proliferation of green “non-governmental organizations,” lobbying hard for green regulations at the expense of ordinary people. Another was the use of “economic instruments” or “fiscal instruments” – such as new taxes – in order to bring about environmentalist goals. A third was medium and long-term objectives for reducing pollution, or in bureaucrat-speak, “target-oriented approaches towards structural change.” This led to the appalling culture of arbitrary, collective “targets” and “limits,” to which, despite Brexit, we are still subjected today. And those “targets” and “limits,” far from being realistic goalposts, were designed to be tightened again and again as time went on.

Moreover, the next EAP, to begin in 1992, would include, in Christian Hey’s words, “structural change in favour of public transport.”

With hindsight, we can now see that the evil genie was out of the bottle. Even before the Rio conference started, the European and UK political élites had set in motion policies which, unless halted quickly, would inevitably lead to the mess we find ourselves in today. Did you vote for the “structural change” we were being subjected to? I sure as hell didn’t.

The philosopher in me has formed an idea of what has been, and still is, going on. We human beings have an innate urge to take control of our surroundings. It is a major, and vital, part of our nature. It is why we build buildings, take part in economic activity, and engineer solutions to make the world a better place for us to live. But the political élites that were setting the green agendas had perverted this urge into a desire to control us, the honest, productive human beings of the world.

Rio to the millennium

Perversion of the precautionary principle – Part 1

The precautionary principle, in the form in which I was taught it, says: “Look before you leap.” That is, don’t act unless and until you are pretty sure that the benefits of action are not outweighed by the costs or damage caused by that action. It can even be construed as: “First, do no harm.”

But the UK Tory party, for one, had by 1992 already formed a perverted view of the precautionary principle. In their 1992 election manifesto, they described it as: “the need to act, where there is significant risk of damage, before the scientific evidence is conclusive.” That is a far cry from “Look before you leap!” Indeed, it is not at all far away from its opposite.

At Rio, John Major and cohorts signed up to the “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.” And, in particular, to Principle 15: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”

Now, I find that idea rather bizarre. For, if you don’t have a high degree of scientific certainty about the size and likelihood of a problem, how can you possibly assess whether or not a proposed counter-measure is cost-effective? Yet, with a recklessness typical of dishonest, unaccountable politicians, they signed us up to it anyway.

That was an egregious violation of the true precautionary principle. And it marked the first of the three steps, in which the ruling classes perverted it into a tool for tyranny.

Political pressure against drivers

Before the ink was even dry on the Rio agreements, government regulation of air pollution from cars began to increase greatly.

In 1992, the EU (as it was soon to become) issued its first vehicle emissions standards. In the UK, catalytic converters were required in petrol engines. The London Air Quality Network (LAQN) was formed, to monitor various pollutants. This was later extended into the UK-wide Automated Urban/Rural Network (AURN). And the “Advisory Group on Medical Aspects of Air Pollution Episodes,” forerunner of COMEAP, issued its first report.

In 1993, the Clean Air Act regulated the content of motor fuels. John Selwyn Gummer, an extreme green Tory, became environment secretary. And the anti-car spin machine went into overdrive. Our TV screens showed (staged) pictures of rural roads chock-a-block with cars. Of traffic jams in foggy weather, complete with smoking exhaust-pipes. Of the aftermaths of accidents. It was hard, even back then, to avoid thinking that we drivers were being set up.

Air pollution and mortality

In the USA, the “Six Cities” study was published in 1993. This set out to “estimate the effects of air pollution on mortality, while controlling for individual risk factors.” The lead author was Douglas Dockery. Other authors included C. Arden Pope and Frank Speizer. The timing suggests, to me, that there may well have been political interests driving this work.

The paper found: “After adjusting for smoking and other risk factors, we observed statistically significant and robust associations between air pollution and mortality.” And: “Air pollution was positively associated with death from lung cancer and cardiopulmonary disease but not with death from other causes considered together.”

James Enstrom

At some time between 1992 and 1994, a US epidemiologist, James Enstrom, who had been working on projects funded by the American Cancer Society (ACS), had his funding from that source terminated. Enstrom was later to become a controversial figure, mainly through his 2003 paper on passive smoking and his 2005 California Cancer Prevention Study.

Road traffic targets

In 1994, a first attempt was made to set binding targets for road traffic levels in the UK. This was initiated by a Welsh nationalist MP, with a bill that had actually been written by Friends of the Earth and the Green Party!

With hindsight, we can see that the culture of collective “targets” and “limits” on everything, so beloved of the EU, had already been imported into the UK. Such a collectivist culture inevitably leads to inequity. For when the “limits” or “targets” are exceeded, who will be expected to make sacrifices and to foot the bill? Yes, you’ve guessed it: the ordinary people. The élites will just carry on doing what they want to do, totally ignoring their own hypocrisy.

“Air quality” becomes a buzz-word

The UK Environment Act 1995 brought in a requirement for government to prepare a National Air Quality Strategy. And across the pond, an American Cancer Society study, now generally known as the “ACS original study,” came up with a revised estimate for the impact of air pollution on mortality. It was lower than almost all the earlier estimates. Though it used a different set of data, this study was by no means independent of the Six Cities study, since the lead author was Pope, and Dockery and Speizer were among the co-authors.

In 1996, the EU issued its Ambient Air Quality Directive. This was described as “formulating an ambitious work programme for several decades, while delegating many decisions and tasks to member states, bureaucratic networks or to civil society and business.” That doesn’t sound cheap for the people, does it? Nor democratic, either.

1997 brought the publication of the first UK National Air Quality Strategy, and the start of DEFRA’s (the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) “air quality grant” scheme.

More road traffic reductions – and a small back-track

1997 also brought in the UK a Road Traffic Reduction Act. A brief account of this can be found here: [[2]]. This act, in essence, enabled local authorities to set local targets for reductions in road traffic, and the national government to set regional targets. Once national targets had been removed from the bill, the Tories, still in power at the time, supported it.

After Labour and Tony Blair knocked the Tories out of power, as the paper referenced above observes: “the transport policy of the incoming Labour Government became more engaged with the notion of lessening dependence on the car.”

1998 brought a Road Traffic Reduction (National Targets) Act. This set separate targets for reducing traffic in England, Scotland and Wales. As plans for implementation progressed, it became apparent that this approach simply wasn’t going to work. In essence, traffic levels could not be reduced without trashing the economy. Over the following decade or so, it was, in effect, replaced by plans to control the side-effects of traffic, like congestion and pollution.

It pains me to say anything nice about Labour, or any other political party for that matter. But they do seem, first, to have looked on this occasion for practical solutions rather than one-size-fits-all mandates. And second, to have concentrated on congestion, ameliorating which clearly does bring benefits in time savings to the people, rather than air pollution, where the overall cost versus benefit picture was (and still is) highly dubious.

Perversion of the precautionary principle – Part 2

Meanwhile, across the pond, work continued on one of the most dishonest frauds that activist political governments have ever perpetrated against the people they are supposed to serve. Namely, the perversion of the precautionary principle into a tool for tyranny.

In early 1998, the Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle was held in the USA. It was hosted by Samuel Curtis Johnson, long-time chairman of S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., a founder of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), and described by Fortune magazine as “corporate America's leading environmentalist.” It was convened by a shadowy organization called the Science and Environmental Health Network (SEHN), only founded in 1994. This was the second of the three major steps, in which the principle was perverted, in effect, from “Look before you leap” to “If in doubt about a risk, government must act to prevent it.”

The SEHN’s (much later) account of the conference is here: [[3]]. It says: “The key element of the principle is that it incites us to take anticipatory action in the absence of scientific certainty. At the conclusion of the three-day conference, the diverse group issued a statement calling for government, corporations, communities and scientists to implement the ‘precautionary principle’ in making decisions.”

I have written about Wingspread here: [[4]]. My summary was: “They inverted the burden of proof. They rejected the presumption of innocence. They required the accused (that’s us) to prove a negative. They mandated ‘precautionary’ action, however much pain it would cause. And they threw out all consideration of objective cost-benefit or risk-benefit analysis.”

The EU, UK and UN join forces

In 1998 also, the EU issued a new directive on fuel standards. And COMEAP addressed for the first time the issue of links between air pollution and health.

In 1999, the UK signed up to the Gothenburg Protocol, a “Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone.” This was the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), and marks the point at which the UN added its shoulder to the EU’s push for ambitious “clean air” policies. It set, for the first time, UN controls on emissions of pollutants, as opposed to concentrations, which had been used up to that time. This seems odd to me, as it is concentrations, not emissions, which determine health effects. Perhaps the switch was made to establish a political path towards UN control of emissions? This protocol came into effect in 2005.

Also in 1999, leaded petrol was phased out in the UK.

The state of play at the millennium

With hindsight, we can see that as at the millennium, commitments and regulations and “targets” and “limits,” which would surely cost everyone dearly later, were being made at an ever-increasing pace. And yet, the scientific basis on which all this was being done was hardly understood at all.

Almost all the work had been done in the USA, by – so it appears – a very small clique of “experts,” often working together on multiple occasions. The results were, as yet, crude and uncertain. Even COMEAP was years away from being able to try to assess accurately the size of even the PM2.5 part of the air pollution problem. Moreover, the stage was being set to allow the political élites to ignore any ideas of risk-benefit or cost-benefit analysis, and just to go ahead and do to us what they wanted to do anyway.

The élites had let their green enthusiasm run away with them, and the people – that’s us – were soon going to be expected to pay a hefty price.

The Noughties up to 2008

At this point, the story becomes sufficiently complex, that I feel a need to go back to a chronological approach.

2000 to 2002

In 2000, Air Quality Regulations were imposed in the constituent countries of the UK, which required local authorities to undertake reviews and assessments in their areas against centrally mandated air quality standards. And the Transport Act 2000 introduced the concepts of road pricing schemes and workplace parking levies.

In the same year, the Health Effects Institute (HEI), a US non-profit mainly funded by the EPA, was allowed access to the raw data, by now held by the EPA, which underlay the Six Cities and ACS original studies. They reported that they had validated the original studies. But no independent scientists were allowed access to the data. There were certainly those who thought that this exercise was something of a whitewash.

In 2001, the Euro 3 vehicle emissions standards came into force. And the EU issued its National Emissions Ceiling directive. This set binding emissions ceilings for each country, which were to be achieved by 2010, and not exceeded thereafter. In the UK, COMEAP issued a report, which aimed to provide some provisional estimates of the effects of long-term exposure to particulate matter in the UK. But there were huge uncertainties. One of which was how best to separate out toxicity estimates for PM2.5 from confounding factors like tobacco smoking and sulphur dioxide pollution. In this exercise, they used data from the ACS original study and the HEI reanalysis.

Also in 2001, the Labour government – Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and their scientific adviser David King – decided to offer incentives to drivers to buy diesel cars. They did this, supposedly, because diesel engines emit less carbon dioxide (CO2) per mile than petrol ones, so were expected to cause less putative “global warming!”

In retrospect, this turns out to have been an extremely bad decision. For diesel engines emit far more nitrogen oxides (NOx) per mile than petrol ones. And these gases are said to be toxic, although exactly how toxic is not at all clear. This has now put large numbers of people, who happen to drive diesel cars or vans, in danger of losing their mobility altogether.

In 2002, the 2001 EU directive was introduced in the UK as the National Emission Ceilings Regulations. And an updated version of the ACS study was published, with Pope again as lead author. This is now known as “ACS 2.” It was the risk coefficients from this study that COMEAP was eventually to adopt as applicable to the UK.

Perversion of the precautionary principle – Part 3

2002 was also the year in which the perversion of the precautionary principle, which had begun with the Rio Declaration and extended by the Wingspread Statement, was not only explicitly incorporated into UK government policy, but strengthened too. The Interdepartmental Liaison Group for Risk Assessment, a working party originally set up in 1994, produced a report called: “The Precautionary Principle: Policy and Application”: [[5]].

They saw the purpose of the principle as “to create an impetus to take a decision notwithstanding scientific uncertainty about the nature and extent of the risk.” They saw it as to be applied whenever “it is impossible to assess the risk with sufficient confidence to inform decision-making.” They wanted to invoke it “even if the likelihood of harm is remote.” They said, too, that “the precautionary principle carries a general presumption that the burden of proof shifts away from the regulator having to demonstrate potential for harm towards the hazard creator having to demonstrate an acceptable level of safety.” And they misused an aphorism attributed to Carl Sagan, saying: “‘Absence of evidence of risk’ should never be confused with, or taken as, ‘evidence of absence of risk’.”

This goes further even than the Wingspread Statement did. It doesn’t just invert the burden of proof and require us, the accused, to prove a negative. But it enables them to take “precautionary” action against any risk, even one that is minuscule or very unlikely, instead of requiring an objective risk analysis accurate enough to support good decision making. Moreover, they want the decision to be taken before all the evidence has been mulled over. And even if there’s no evidence at all that our activity causes any harm to anyone, they wouldn’t accept that as evidence!

In essence, the UK government decreed, in contradiction to the norm of presumption of innocence, that absence of evidence of guilt is not evidence of absence of guilt. They decided to re-write the precautionary principle to say, in effect: “If in doubt about a risk, government must act to prevent it.” Regardless of how much harm, or costs, their action causes to the people they are supposed to be serving. This, again, is atrocious conduct.

2003

In 2003, then London mayor “Red Ken” Livingstone introduced a “Congestion Charge” in Central London.

In the same year, a feasibility study was done for what became the London Low Emissions Zone (LEZ). This planned to levy a daily charge on commercial vehicles (lorries, buses, coaches, and minibuses, vans and ambulances over a certain weight) which did not meet a particular standard for PM2.5 emissions. It was envisaged that the standards to be met would be progressively tightened once the scheme was operating. Notice that these charges were implemented long before COMEAP, or anyone else, had made – or even tried to make – any accurate estimates of the benefits that would result from reduced air pollution. The LEZ scheme can, therefore, not possibly have been any more than a money-grab.

It is interesting to note who was the chair of the 2003 feasibility study: Paul Watkiss. Watkiss is associated with Oxford University, and since 2006 has been director of a “Climate Change Consultancy.” He was to be one of the economists who in 2007-9 was to be involved in the UK government’s machinations that led to the dropping of the “social cost of carbon” approach to assessing the impacts of CO2 emissions. This move, in effect, made it impossible to do a proper cost versus benefit analysis on anything involving CO2 emissions.

Watkiss has also worked more recently with the Climate Change Committee (CCC), towards “aggregate estimates of the costs of adaptation” to changes in the climate. It does concern me that, so it seems, even now these costs are not well understood. How can you possibly start any project, most of all one using other people’s money, without an idea of how much it is likely to cost?

It is also worth recording that 2003 marked the debut of the “Green Book,” a set of procedures meant to guide cost versus benefit analyses carried out by the UK government.

2005

In 2005, Paul Watkiss was part of a team analyzing the EU’s proposed Clean Air for Europe (CAFE) programme, which became an EU directive in 2008. (Notice the change of the branding from “air quality” to “clean air!”) It is interesting to note that several on this same team later became members of COMEAP.

Also in 2005, the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) updated its “air quality guidelines,” which included a guideline for PM2.5 that was an order of magnitude lower than previous limits, even than the EU’s. And London mayor Livingstone founded C40, “a global network of mayors taking urgent action to confront the climate crisis and create a future where everyone can thrive.”

Meanwhile, across the pond, James Enstrom and his team published the California Cancer Prevention Study. This found the risks of mortality from PM2.5 pollution in the group studied to be at least an order of magnitude lower than other studies were finding at the time.

Now, Enstrom was already in the bad books of the establishment for his 2003 publication in the Lancet, which concluded: “The results do not support a causal relation between environmental tobacco smoke and tobacco related mortality, although they do not rule out a small effect. The association between exposure to environmental tobacco smoke and coronary heart disease and lung cancer may be considerably weaker than generally believed.” Soon after, the ACS accused him of “denying that passive smoking was harmful” – hardly a scientific rebuttal of his paper! And this 2005 paper did not endear him to the activists, either.

2006 to 2008

In 2006, the Euro 4 vehicle standards came in. Petrol vehicles meeting this standard are today exempt from ULEZ. Things were not so good on the diesel front, though. The LAQN’s report for 2006 and 2007 – which, curiously, wasn’t published until 2009 – stated that the EU limit value for NO2 was being “consistently exceeded at background sites in inner London and at roadside sites throughout London.” And insiders at the European Federation for Transport and Environment had found out that, in the “real world” as opposed to laboratory testing, emissions of nitrogen oxides from diesel engines were much higher than the limits the cars were supposedly built to meet. But this was not to become known to the general public until nine years later, with the “Volkswagen diesel scandal.”

One intervention in 2006, which did seem to produce positive results, was stricter controls over the sulphur content of marine fuels. And in 2007, “sulphur content of liquid fuels” legislation was passed in the UK and other countries, based on an EU directive. The introduction of “ultra-low sulphur” diesel, in the words of a 2016 report, “caused an almost-immediate decrease of up to 60% in the level of sub-micrometre particle pollution in the air that we breathe.” (These particles are PM1 size, even smaller than most PM2.5).

Looking back at UK fuel prices over the years, the price difference per litre between diesel and petrol did go up for a couple of years from 2007, but was all but gone by 2010. This suggests that – for once – an environmentalist measure did actually achieve a result, without causing people great pain. It would be interesting to know how big, if at all, was the corresponding drop in the recorded number of deaths due to causes which are, or may be, attributable to air pollution from cars!

It was in 2007 also that the London Congestion Charge area was extended westwards, to almost twice its original size.

The UK government and its advisors were also active in the air pollution area in 2007. Updated Air Quality Strategies were produced for the constituent countries of the UK. And the Air Quality Expert Group (AQEG) produced a report on “Air quality and climate change,” here: [[6]]. Reading the summary conclusions, the interaction between policies designed to “mitigate” one or the other is a complex subject!

It is also interesting to see that there was considerable overlap between the personnel in AQEG and COMEAP. This is understandable, if the skills needed are in limited supply. But it is also concerning, when looked at in the light of potential for groupthink, and vulnerability to influence by activist members. The same year also saw the production by COMEAP of a draft, which later became their major 2009 report.

In 2008, the EU issued yet another omnibus directive, on Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe. And the London LEZ went into operation.

That’s it for the back-story up to and including 2008.


Sunday, 7 April 2024

The Back-story behind Anti-Car Policies in the UK, Part One: Air Pollution Episodes

In the summer of 2017, I did some calculations comparing the social cost of particulate matter (PM) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from cars to the charges to be levied by the then forthcoming London Ultra Low Emissions Zone (ULEZ). The article is here: [[1]]. I concluded that the ULEZ charges were out of all proportion to the social costs of the pollution, which I had calculated using the UK government’s own recommended figures. In summary, ULEZ was even back then, and still is, a total rip-off.

At the time, I – naïvely, perhaps – did not consider the possibility that the UK government’s figures themselves might have been products of a process that was not entirely scientific or honest. So, I let the subject of air pollution lie for a while. I turned my attention to other aspects of the struggle between, on the one side, we human beings, and on the other, the political élites that claim they have a right to rule over us.

Background

Climate change

In the years since 2017, I have gained a clearer picture of the science, or lack of it, behind the “global warming” or “climate change” narrative. And of the political machinations which have been going on to maintain that narrative, to conceal the costs associated with it, and to prevent the truth being brought out into the open. I also found that, among the perpetrators of these machinations, the UK government has been one of the most prominent. In that, indeed, it has been second only to the United Nations, for 50+ years the main driver of the green agenda.

That work generated a set of five essays, published in the spring of 2023: [[2]], [[3]], [[4]], [[5]], [[6]]. (I give these links for reference only. My argument here is independent of them).

In the first essay, I exposed the lack of hard evidence for the idea that there is a problem with the climate. And the lack of hard evidence that any such problem, even if it did exist, would have been caused by human emissions of greenhouse gases. Or that it would be a crisis. Or that cutting carbon dioxide emissions would do any good for the climate at all.

In the remaining four essays, I uncovered the back-story behind this narrative and the policies it has spawned. These included: Dishonest and tyrannical behaviour by the UK government and their hangers-on against the people they are supposed to serve. Co-operation by our supposed representatives with the anti-human deep green agenda, that has been driven by the United Nations for more than 50 years. The inversion and perversion of the “precautionary principle” into a tool for tyranny, and the consequent sidelining of objective risk analysis. Corruption of science. Persistent moving of the goalposts, always in the direction of increasing restriction. And the shenanigans, through which our enemies have made it all but impossible to do objective cost-benefit analysis of these policies.

Anti-car policies

Meanwhile, anti-car policies have proceeded apace. In particular, the ULEZ was expanded from its original scope in central London, first in 2021 to inner London, then to the boroughs of outer London, including many places which are all but rural. The latest expansion, in August 2023, is still the subject of protests and other ructions. There are also now “default” 20mph speed limits throughout Wales. Local councils are producing “transport plans,” which will place serious obstacles in the way of drivers, both in terms of exorbitant costs and of loss of ease and convenience. These obstacles are likely to force many older or poorer drivers out of their cars, meaning that the hardest hit will lose their mobility entirely. And there is a “Vision Zero” road safety campaign in my area, that is horribly reminiscent of the “Net Zero” shenanigans of the last few years.

I realized that there could be some merit in doing for the anti-car agendas the same exercise that I had earlier done for the climate agenda. So today, I will start to document the back-story behind the anti-car policies, which have plagued the people of the UK, under governments of all parties, for 30 years and more.

I have previously published parts of this back-story, but have never before tried to assemble the whole of it in one place. My exposition will inevitably, therefore, be long. To mitigate this, I plan to split it into six essays. This, the first, will look at the facts on the issue variously dubbed “air pollution” or “clean air,” which is being used as one of the major excuses for anti-car policies. The second will cover the history behind these policies, up to 2008. The third will cover the UK government report of 2009, which tried to make a scientific justification for air pollution reduction policies. The fourth and fifth will cover the history from 2009 to the present, and schemes currently in progress, with particular reference to my local area. And the last will summarize what I found, and present my conclusions.

Smogs and Hazes

There are generally regarded as being two types of major air pollution episode, other than those caused by a specific chemical leak. These are “smogs” and “hazes.” Smogs generally occur in Western and Asian cities, in relatively cold climates. They also take place mainly in early winter. But hazes occur over larger areas, and are found almost exclusively in the warmth of south and south-east Asia.

I tried to classify the major episodes of air pollution, which have had significant, proven adverse health consequences to human beings, into one of these types. I found that most could be classified as either smog or haze. But a few may have elements of both.

I shall start with smogs, since these were historically the first to draw attention.

The Great Smog of 1952

The start point of the story is the London “Great Smog” of December 1952. During a cold, windless winter week-end, unusual amounts of air pollutants concentrated in the atmosphere in and around London. The weather conditions included a temperature inversion, in which a layer of warm air traps a much colder layer beneath it, which has the effect of holding pollutants within the cold layer close to the ground. This produced a fog, in which visibility and air quality were both very poor for several days in a row.

This was not different in kind to the “pea-souper” fogs, to which Londoners were well accustomed. But this one was unusually serious in its effects.

The 1953 report

A 1953 report by the UK government Committee on Air Pollution [[7]] addressed the pollution issues which led to the smog. Here are some of its salient points:

[Page 6]. “The problem of air pollution… is also a problem of great complexity.” “The harmful and dangerous ‘smog’ occurs only when smoke and oxides of sulphur and perhaps other deleterious substances are present in the fog in quantity.” “Both medical opinion and chemical investigation indicate that the deleterious effects of the oxides of sulphur are greatly enhanced by the presence of smoke particles…”

On page 10, the pollutants were identified as: “Solid: Particles of carbon or soot causing black smoke, and particles of coal, coke, smoke, and ash carried forward as dust and grit in the chimney gases. Liquid or semi-solid carbonaceous matter: Particles of tarry matter causing yellowish brown smoke. Unburnt and partially burnt gases: Hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide. Sulphur oxides: Sulphur dioxide gas and sulphur trioxide mist, which with water give sulphurous and sulphuric acids.” Interestingly, there was no mention of nitrogen oxides.

[Pages 15-16]. “The London ‘smog’ was accompanied by an immediate and sudden rise in both illness and mortality. The number of deaths over and above those expected in the first three weeks of December indicate that some 4,000 people died as a result of the smog.”

[Page 17]. According to hospital data, “respiratory disease was nearly quadrupled,” and “heart disease figures rose to three times the normal numbers.”

The report included two graphs. The first [Page 18] showed deaths versus levels of sulphur dioxide and smoke for the period around the Great Smog:


Figure 1

Now, I would read that graph as showing a good correlation, and perhaps suggesting a possible causation worth investigating, between sulphur dioxide (SO2) levels and deaths a day or two later. The correlation between “smoke” (particulate matter or PM, as it is now known) and deaths is far less strong.

The second graph [Page 19] showed deaths and SO2 levels over a period of months surrounding the smog event:

Figure 2

That graph, too, suggests a degree of correlation between SO2 pollution and deaths in both winters. From all this, it was estimated that as many as 12,000 people may have died from, or had their lives shortened by, the effects of the Great Smog. The main culprit for the smog, so it seems, was sulphur dioxide (SO2). Its effects were enhanced by the presence of solid carbonaceous particles. Both are produced by the burning of coal, and to a lesser extent the burning of oil.

However, pollution from SO2 was not the only deadly issue around the time. There was a flood in Eastern England in early February 1953, and though some of the deaths from this flood took place in places like Canning Town, these were not considered part of London at the time. So, the large number of London deaths in the first half of February was, presumably, not – even in part – due to the flood.

Nor, according to the above graph, was it directly due to the level of SO2 at the time (around weeks 32-33). Moreover, the SO2 peak in early March does not seem to have had any significant effect on mortality. So, the report’s initial assertion, that both particulate matter and sulphur oxides must be present to produce a dangerous smog, seems justified.

Conclusions of the report

I will quote some of the main conclusions of the report. [Pages 29-30]. “Complete cure of both solid and gaseous pollution, if indeed it be ever attainable, is bound to take many years, but means of averting at least the worst evils of air pollution by smoke and grit are within practicable reach. It is simply a question of balancing the cost and inconvenience of enforcing a more scientific use of our fuels against all the advantages to be gained in health, convenience and economy from a clear atmosphere. This problem, with all that is involved in a real attack on the menace of air pollution, is one which must be faced.”

I can agree with the second sentence above, except the word “simply.” But it seems worrying to me that even back in 1953, there was already growing in government minds a grandiose idea of complete cures for environmental problems, to be reached through an attack on them.

And the final sentences [page 30] are even more concerning, ending with a plea for “general acceptance of the fact that the cure will require heavy expenditure and full co-operation of all persons and all interests.” With hindsight, this can be seen as a warning for the future, that even in 1953 the recently elected Tory government already had plans for large-scale and costly political interventions in the name of “clean air.”

Consequent political action

Back then, coal was the primary fuel both for heating and for power generation. The reason why so much sulphur dioxide was emitted from coal-burning in the UK was that the government had decided to export most of the higher-grade coal, in order to re-fill its coffers after the war. The people, and the power generators, were left with low-grade coal, with a high sulphur content. So, the Great Smog was, with hindsight, a disaster waiting to happen. A disaster whose ultimate cause, if I may be cynical, was government putting its own interests ahead of the interests of the people it was supposed to be serving.

The result was political action, and the Clean Air Act 1956, which led to a number of follow-ups. Over a decade and more, levels of air pollution, particularly sulphur dioxide, were significantly reduced. Precisely how much benefit that achieved, through lowering deaths and illnesses due to SO2 pollution, is a question to which I have not been able to find any clear answer. Nor, indeed, could I find any estimate of how much more costly it made the lives of the people of the UK. But the effects of the original Clean Air Act and its successors, overall, are today considered by most people to have been positive.

The importance of the Great Smog is that it established for the first time, in the minds of government and its bureaucrats, if not also of many of the general public, the idea that “public health” issues due to air pollution were something in which government has a right to interfere. At the time, of course, all this had little or nothing to do with cars, which were still not ubiquitous even in London. There were only two and a half million cars in the whole UK. But in hindsight, the Clean Air Act 1956 was to be the thin end of an extremely large wedge.

London pollution levels prior to 1952

We don’t have any reports of huge negative effects from individual smog events in London prior to 1952. But we do have this data: [[8]]. Average PM levels in London peaked in the 1890s, at around 620 µg/m3 (micrograms per cubic metre). The average PM level in 1952 was 200 of these units, and in 2016 was 16. This represents a drop by a factor of 12.5 since the year of the Great Smog, and of almost 40 since the 19th-century peak.

The same page also gives data on some of the health effects. “Air pollution deaths throughout this period rose steeply; in London, mortality from bronchitis increased from 25 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 1840 to 300 deaths per 100,000 in 1890. At its peak, 1-in-350 people died from bronchitis.”

Back in 1952, there was no understanding of the particle sizes in the different components of particulate matter. Today, however, since smaller particles can more easily find their way into the lungs, we distinguish between PM10 (particles less than 10 microns or 10 micrometres), PM2.5 (less than 2.5 microns) and PM1 (less than 1 micron). PM2.5 is considered to be the maximum size limit for particles to be easily taken into the lungs.

Other significant smogs

The Great Smog was not the first smog. But it was by far the most serious in its proven effects on the population. Here are a few other smogs, which have had bad enough health effects to acquire their own monikers.

Meuse Valley fog 1930

This was a fog in the Belgian part of the Meuse Valley, which occurred in early December 1930 and killed over 60 people. It was accompanied by a temperature inversion. It was diagnosed as probably due to emissions of gases containing fluorine, such as hydrogen fluoride, from nearby factories. Fluorine is very reactive and highly toxic: not nice stuff to be breathing. Its emissions have been controlled since the 1950s, and it is not put forward as a serious pollutant today.

St. Louis smog 1939

At the end of November 1939, St. Louis, Missouri underwent a severe smog episode. This was diagnosed as due to the burning of low-grade, bituminous coal: combined with a temperature inversion.

This suggests that the Great Smog in London, 13 years later, was very likely due to the same causes.

Donora smog 1948

This was a very local smog, confined to one mill town in Pennsylvania. But it nevertheless killed 20 people. This seems to have been caused by emissions of hydrogen fluoride and SO2 from local factories. Combined with, you’ve guessed it, a temperature inversion.

Interestingly, the proportion of the 12,000 of London’s then 8.3 million population estimated to have been killed or otherwise harmed by the London smog is very close to the proportion of Donora’s population killed in the 1948 smog, about one in 700.

Yokkaichi asthma

Between 1960 and 1972, an industrial area in southern Japan was affected by outbreaks of serious respiratory problems. This was generally blamed on local industrial emissions of SO2; although some researchers have suggested it may have been more due to sulphur trioxide (SO3), which with water forms sulphuric acid.

New York City smog 1966

This occurred in late November in the New York metropolitan area, and in parts of New Jersey and Connecticut. It was blamed on emissions of smoke, SO2 and carbon monoxide, and made worse by a large mass of stagnant air, and a temperature inversion. (Again).

This smog was responsible for kick-starting controls on air pollution in the USA, including the 1967 Air Quality Act and the 1970 Clean Air Act. The former greatly expanded the federal government’s reach in the area of pollution. And the latter led to programs and bureaucracies which have continued to this day, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It is interesting that these phrases “air quality” and “clean air” are still used today in accusing us of “sins of emission!”

Harbin smog 2013

This occurred in Harbin and surrounding areas in North-East China in late October 2013. It was said to be due to a combination of unseasonably warm temperatures and very little wind. PM levels were very high, and the pollution was blamed on farmers burning crop waste, together with the start-up of the coal-fired communist district heating system for the winter.

Eastern China smog 2013

This smog occurred further south than, and more than a month after, the Harbin smog. It was blamed on coal burning and factory emissions, both of which produce SO2 and nitrates. There was also a lack of air flow, which kept pollution trapped low to the ground. Uniquely, this smog and its effects covered a far wider area than just one city or even one province.

Great Smog of Delhi 2016

In November 2016, there began in Delhi and surroundings a “Great Smog,” which went on for almost three months. Delhi’s air quality problems reach a large peak each year in November and December, two of the four coolest months in the year.

The main cause of this particular smog, and likely of the recurrent air quality problems, seems to be the burning of stubble by farmers in neighbouring provinces. Stubble burning produces, not only PM and SO2, but also nitrogen oxides (NOx). The BBC reports, here: [[9]]. Other pollution causes have been suggested, including vehicle emissions. But these do not explain the seasonality of the regular air quality issues.

A local example

I myself can attest that the burning of stubble can produce high levels of pollution. This was a common practice among UK farmers in my youth. Most kinds of stubble burning were banned in the UK in 1993, but I do recall a particular incident in – if I remember right – about 2000. Some local crop fields had been purchased, to be turned into a garden centre. Presumably, the area burned was too small to fall foul of the regulations at that time. But I remember that the air was extremely unpleasant to breathe, and the stink lasted five days.

Hazes

Hazes, in contrast to smogs, tend to occur in some of the warmest parts of the world. Hazes have been recorded in south-east Asia since about 1972. In recent decades, these have become an almost yearly event, with the worst conditions being reported in 1997 and 2015.

The 1997 haze was diagnosed as caused by “slash-and-burn” agricultural fires in Indonesia. This is a traditional agricultural practice in the region. On top of this, considerable areas of land in Indonesia consist of dried-out peat forests, which when burned produce pollution with a high sulphur content. It seems that this practice was responsible in large part for the later hazes, too.

The fires were unusually widespread in 1997, due to El Niño causing the dry season (which lasts usually from April to September or October) to be exceptionally dry. The fires produced particulate matter, which spread over a large swathe of south and south-east Asia, going as far afield as Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The negative health effects of this mixture were significant.

Causes of smogs and hazes

The above suggests that there are two sets of causes, which have been shown to produce air pollution leading to proven, measurable, significantly negative health effects.

PM and SO2

The first of these causes is industrial pollution that includes both particulate matter and sulphur oxides. Sometimes, it may also include nitrogen oxides; but it is not clear that these are necessary to produce serious health effects. PM and SO2 together have been the main culprits in the cold weather smogs. And these serious smogs have always taken place in conditions of stagnant air and low wind, and generally in the presence of a temperature inversion, too.

Burning of coal containing sulphur compounds is the major activity that has produced this pollution mix, both in Western countries and in China. The bad health effects are worst when there is lack of wind, or a temperature inversion. With the exception of the East China smog of 2013, the worst of the effects of these smogs seem to be limited to a relatively small area, such as a single city, at any one time.

Burning of vegetation

The second cause is burning of vegetation on the large scale, as part of agricultural practices. This is the major cause of the south-east Asian hazes. It also, in my view, was probably the main cause of the Harbin smog of 2013. For if the communal heating system had been the culprit, we would have expected to see such smogs happening in most years, not just this one.

Whether burning off old stubble, or slash-and-burn for new crops, the burning of vegetation produces pollution containing particulate matter and sulphur compounds. In the case of stubble burning, significant amounts of nitrogen oxides may be given off, too.

The 2016 Great Smog of Delhi covered a wide area, and the weather while cold for the location was not cold in temperate-zone terms. It could well be that this particular incident was down to a combination of the two causes.

Which pollutants are the toxic ones?

I will repeat parts of two key sentences from the 1953 report on the Great Smog in London. “The harmful and dangerous ‘smog’ occurs only when smoke and oxides of sulphur and perhaps other deleterious substances are present in the fog in quantity.” And: “Both medical opinion and chemical investigation indicate that the deleterious effects of the oxides of sulphur are greatly enhanced by the presence of smoke particles…”

The first sentence is clear. You need both PM and sulphur oxides to produce a dangerous smog. So, PM alone is not necessarily a problem. And the second tells us that sulphur oxides alone constitute a far lesser problem than sulphur oxides plus PM. (Perhaps this may account for the SO2 peak in early March 1953 failing to produce a corresponding increase in deaths.) So, neither one nor the other produces a serious smog, but a combination of both. This conclusion is borne out by my analysis above of individual smogs and hazes. So far, so good.

But what did the report mean by “perhaps other deleterious substances?” This might, for example, refer to highly toxic divalent metals such as lead, cadmium or perhaps mercury, which can easily react with sulphate ions even in small concentrations. Lead is often present in PM, and could react with sulphuric acid to produce particles of lead sulphate small enough to find their way into the lungs. Such a mechanism might perhaps explain why PM2.5 and sulphates together are more toxic than either alone. Cadmium also is present in PM, particularly in wood smoke.

Alternatively, the report might refer to oxidants produced by a reaction involving sulphates or perhaps nitrates. These are some of the matters, which would later be looked into by COMEAP (Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollution).

To sum up

I have looked at the evidence around those air pollution episodes, both smogs and hazes, which have demonstrably caused significant adverse health effects. The main diagnosis in the government’s report on the London Smog of 1952, that both particulate matter and sulphates are necessary in quantity in order to produce bad health effects, seems to have been borne out by the evidence.

Smogs and hazes seem generally to be caused by a combination of particulate matter and sulphur oxides. The latter may come either from industrial emissions, or from the burning of stubble or other vegetation with a high sulphur content. Indeed, all the serious smogs and hazes I looked at had both these pollutants present in large quantities. Many had unusual meteorological conditions, too: stagnant air, low wind, or even a temperature inversion.

But I get a feeling that the whole story may prove to be a bit more complicated than that.


Saturday, 23 March 2024

Statistical Shenanigans

The story I will cover today is, in a sense, old news. It first broke about a month ago, in February. It is concerned with statistics: according to Mark Twain, the third of the three categories of lies. And to use a phrase, it gives me furiously to think.

What has happened is that the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) has re-defined the way in which excess deaths are to be calculated. In a way that seems to have greatly reduced the resulting numbers, and thus the apparent size of the ongoing “excess deaths” problem. While breaking the link between their figures and hard evidence from the real world.

Background

Among those who follow health statistics, “excess deaths” has been a big topic of discussion recently. Andrew Bridgen MP, in particular, has brought to public attention that there have been recently, and still are, an awful lot of them. And that this has been going on for some time. Indeed, continuously since the start of the COVID pandemic in early 2020. Not just in the UK, but in many other countries too, both in Europe and outside.

Obviously, a lot of deaths in 2020 and 2021 were caused by COVID itself. But, as the epidemic has waned, the excess deaths have not stopped. In December 2023, deaths in the UK were still being reported for most weeks as significantly above the deaths at the same time of year, averaged over past years. And deaths over the years 2020-2023 as a whole were 9.62% higher than the average deaths per year over the pre-COVID period, 2015-2019.

Calculating excess deaths

The standard way of calculating excess deaths for a period of the year is (has been) as follows. Count the deaths recorded in the period of interest (usually a week, defined by particular start and end days) in the geographical area of interest (such as the UK as a whole). Take a suitable base period, usually 5 years long, and count the deaths recorded over the same period of the year during each of the years in the base period. Divide by the number of years in the base period to give an average. Subtract this average from the deaths recorded in the period, to give the total number of excess deaths in the period. This is usually expressed as a percentage increase (or decrease) relative to the base period.

There is a simple description of the method, on a page from the British Heart Foundation (BHF), here: [[1]]. But plainly, we are talking about the same calculation.

You can do this calculation on filtered data, too. If you have your raw data sufficiently well broken down, you can produce an excess deaths figure – for example – restricted to people aged 35-44, people in England only, people who died of a particular cause or causes, or people who were vaccinated against COVID (or not). If the population of such a cohort has changed significantly since the base period, you might need feel a need to re-express the figures in terms of deaths per hundred, thousand or million in the cohort, in order to allow a fairer comparison.

One vital thing to note about this process. All the data which go into it are real-world data. A death is (was) a death. It happened. Surely, the data may be incomplete as yet, or subject to later change (for example, if a coroner has still to determine the cause of death). But at some point, the data that goes into the calculation becomes definitive for all time. There are no models involved, no opportunities to massage the data, and no ambiguity in the results, except perhaps in how best to express them.

Base period changes

In principle, you can do this calculation for any base period for which you have data broken down in the same way as for the period of interest to you. In practice, the base period normally used is (has been) the last five years prior to the year you are considering. This base period (2015-2019) was indeed used for the 2020 figures. It was obviously not possible to use 2020 data as part of a base period, because the figures were perturbed by COVID. So, the base period 2015-2019 continued to be used for 2021.

It looks as though, for 2022 and 2023, the base period used was the six years prior to the year of interest, cutting out 2020. I am surprised that 2021 was not cut out as well as 2020. For the deaths due to COVID in England and Wales in 2021 (67,350, 11.5% of all deaths) [[2]] were very much comparable with those in 2020 (73,766, 12.1% of the total) [[3]]. COVID deaths in 2022 were small in comparison to these two years, but still not insignificant.

The ONS proposal

On February 20th, 2024, the ONS published a new proposal for how to calculate excess deaths. It is here: [[4]]. The document does not state the rationale for making the changes, but dives right into their main features.

Estimating expected deaths

Here is the top bullet point. “Trends in population size, ageing and mortality rates are accounted for by the new method for estimating the expected number of deaths used in the calculation of excess mortality (the difference between the actual and expected number of deaths); this is not the case for the current method, which uses a simple five-year average to estimate the number of expected deaths.”

My instant reaction to this was: What’s all this about ‘estimating’ an ‘expected’ number? As soon as an estimate raises its head, we are no longer in the real world of death certificates, doctors and coroners. My bullshit meter is triggered to, at the very least, “orange alert” status.

Now, I am not criticizing government for projecting future deaths. I expect such projections would be important to certain government departments, for example those who calculate budgets for state pensions. What I am criticizing is the substitution, for an “excess deaths” figure based entirely on measured data, of one which is calculated using a “statistical model.” If they felt they needed a new measure, that is one thing. But to give the new measure the same name as the old, particularly in an area which is attracting interest from MPs and from the general public, I see as – at best – a serious obfuscation.

Change in the mechanics

There is also a change in the mechanics of the calculations. “Individual weeks and months that were substantially affected by the immediate mortality impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic are removed from the data when estimating expected deaths in subsequent periods…”

This acknowledges the problem I brought up above: why was 2021 not dropped from the base period also, when looking at 2022 onwards? It would be interesting to see what the effects would have been under the old method, if this had been done.

The new definition

The new approach amounts not just to a new way to calculate excess deaths, but to a re-definition of the concept of excess deaths. “Excess mortality is the difference between the observed number of deaths in a particular period and the number of deaths that would have been expected in that period, based on historical data.” In place of my understanding, which is: “Excess mortality is the difference between the observed number of deaths in a particular period in a year and the numbers of deaths recorded for that period in the year in the past, based on an average of historical data.”

Supporting blog post

The document links to a supporting blog post, here: [[5]]. This says: “The weakness of this [the old] approach is that it doesn’t take into account the ageing and growing population of the UK (all else being equal, more people means more deaths, particularly if a greater share of the population are elderly); nor does it reflect recent trends in population mortality rates, which were generally falling until 2011 before levelling off until the onset of the pandemic.”

In my view, the first is only a weakness if you are not “slicing and dicing” your data finely enough. Ageing can be taken into account by considering age group cohorts separately. And population growth can be dealt with by re-expressing the results in terms of percentages for each cohort. As to trends, the way you should look for them is to plot the raw data, then analyze any trends that may appear.

The article also says: “Importantly, this approach moves away from averages drawn from raw numbers…” Leaving unanswered the zillion dollar question: Why do this in the first place? My bullshit meter is now on full red. “Code Red for humanity,” ho ho.

The detail of the algorithm

The original post gives some details of the statistical model. They use a “quasi Poisson regression.” (A technique which, pun intended, is seen by some as a bit fishy). OK, they are trying to model many sets of data all at once, rather than having to do many different calculations for different cohorts, one by one. But I for one am still stuck at the starting-gate. Why did they feel a need to do any modelling at all?

Testing, testing…

Like good scientists, the ONS have tested their model against the previously published real-world-based numbers. They say: “On an annual basis, the new method estimates 76,412 excess deaths in the UK in 2020, compared with 84,064 estimated by the current method (Table 2) … In the latest year, 2023, the new method estimates 10,994 excess deaths in the UK, 20,448 fewer than the current method.”

That last is an amazing difference. The new method estimates only one-third of the excess deaths which, according to the old method, have already happened!

And remember, we are talking about 2023 here. In which, the deaths ascribed to COVID are minuscule compared with 2020 or 2021, and even small compared to 2022. A 20 or even 30 per cent difference I might have believed, allowing for aging and population growth. But nearly 200 per cent, no.

Anyone worthy of the name scientist always performs one key step of the scientific method before they publish their results. That is, to check the predicted consequences of their hypothesis against what is evident in the real world. And if the two are too far apart (bearing in mind appropriate confidence intervals), the hypothesis must be modified, or even scrapped.

I give kudos to the ONS for doing the check. But I would rate this result a failure. Even climate models can “hindcast” successfully to a certain extent. But this one can’t even get close to the figures for last year!

As an outside observer, I would conclude either that their model is not fit for purpose, or that its actual purpose is something other than what is being put forward. I smell rat.

The politics

There is, of course, an enormous amount of politicking going on in and around this area. The reactions which Andrew Bridgen received when he first brought up the subject in parliament suggest that someone, or some group, in a very high position does NOT want the full truth about excess deaths in the UK since 2020 brought out into the open.

Now, when I was young, I was told that there were three things you could always trust: the government, the police and the Post Office. Being a strongly evidence-based person, I never believed this. And my 70 years to date have provided strong evidence that I was right in my disbelief. I have seen government, again and again and again, lie, mislead, stonewall, obfuscate or try to suppress discussion when dealing with the people they are supposed to serve. “Three weeks to flatten the curve.” “Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.” “There’s a climate crisis.” To say there is no climate crisis is “denial,” “misinformation” or “conspiracy theory.” “The Post Office Horizon system is free from faults.” “The COVID vaccines are safe and effective.” There have been many more.

I have become sufficiently cynical, that my best guess is that this exercise was intended to suppress the truth over excess deaths, and so to sweep the whole issue under the carpet. My level of trust in government is now below zero. I regard anything they say as a lie or a misdirection, until I find hard evidence otherwise. I know I am not alone in such views.

Where did my data go?

So, it seems that the ONS are not going to publish proper excess deaths numbers for any dates after the end of 2023. The next thing, I thought was: what about other data sources?

Well, other UK government departments publish similar data. The Office for Health Improvements and Disparities (OHID), for example, has a page here: [[7]]. Here it is:

OHID’s excess deaths data is being nobbled, too. The page linked to by the green box talks about a change to a “post-pandemic method,” and was first published on – ahem – the same day as the ONS paper. This suggests this change is UK government wide, not just the ONS.

So, let’s try the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) [[8]]:

So, their old platform is about to be removed. Convenient, eh? I tried the new one, but it returned hundreds of results for “excess deaths,” the only even partly relevant looking one being “infant mortality.” For “mortality by week,” it returned over 11,000 results!

Strike two. So, let’s haul out the big guns.

The Our World in Data COVID data feed has never failed me yet (except when it switches columns around without warning). I got the latest file, and was a bit surprised to see that Our World in Data are now getting their excess mortality figures, not from national governments, but from the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO). When I looked at the contents, while there were records in the file for 2024, the excess mortality figures – for ALL countries – cut off precisely on December 31st, 2023. Before then, the more statistically savvy countries, including the UK, had been able to provide these figures on a weekly basis with a lag time of 3 to 4 weeks. Now, niks. For almost three months. Strike three.

So, the dog has eaten my data. It looks as if the entire world may have stopped providing any excess mortality figures which are founded on real-world evidence! Cynical me does not think this is a co-incidence.

For today, I shall refrain from saying any more.


Wednesday, 20 March 2024

Google versus DPS Computing

A company called DPS Computing has for some months been relaying videos of the Post Office inquiry chaired by Sir Wyn Williams. These videos have been most interesting, showing, to all who can see, just how dishonest the Post Office representatives have been in their actions regarding the Horizon computer system.

The Post Office prosecuted several hundred sub-postmasters on false grounds of financial fraud, when the only “evidence” of any “fraud” came from their own flawed computer system. When the sub-postmasters started to fight back, they were met only by a renewed assault of lies and attempts to suppress them. When they got as far as taking a civil case to the courts, the Post Office tried to force the judge to recuse himself. All credit to Mr Justice Fraser for soldiering on, and doing his job properly.

Time and tide have moved on, and the Post Office themselves are now the subject of inquiry. They have fought like cornered snakes, and tried to “lawfare” their way into silencing the inquiry, even trying to force Sir Wyn Williams to recuse himself.

Then, along came DPS Computing, with a series of videos aiming to bring the evidence given at this inquiry to the multitude. I’ve watched 20 or 30 of them, and together they convey one message. The Post Office, and the individuals acting for it, are guilty of one of the biggest crimes committed in these islands since William the Conqueror’s invasion.

And yet, yesterday DPS Computing felt it necessary to publish this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qy5HSeIB0Tg. And the follow-up today: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6symM3hBzk.

Let me try to paraphrase. Google (owner of YouTube) has suspended DPS Computing’s account with them, on the supposed grounds that someone else “associated” with them has committed some breach of some “policy.” Without telling them any specifics of what they, or even their “associates,” are accused of. Or even who their accused “associates” are!

This violates, at least, articles 10, 11 and 19 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Not that the UN themselves have any concern for human rights these days. It also violates the European Convention on Human Rights, article 6.3(a) and (b).

And the timing is interesting. Particularly in the context of the “on-line safety bill.” Someone in the global establishment seems to think that we need to be “protected” from the truth. At least as it pertains to the Post Office inquiry… and COVID vaccine injuries… and a lot more that, if brought out into the open, would destroy the credibility of the political class.

Edmund Burke told us, 250 years ago this year: “Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.” He was right. But I will give you my two follow-ups. One, “Bad laws should not be obeyed.” Two, “Those that promote, support, make, enforce or condone bad laws are criminals.”

I was going to add a third about those that lie or mislead. But that’s enough for now.