Monday, 9 October 2017

Dysfunctional democracy

The dysfunctional nature of the current political system – and, in particular, of democracy – has been thrown into sharp relief by recent events in Catalonia. In this brief essay, I’ll try to diagnose the problem, and to give a broad outline of a possible solution.

The Catalan situation

Here’s the background, as far as I can make it out. A desire for Catalan independence from Spain has been simmering since the 1920s. The Catalans were on the losing (Republican) side in the 1936-9 civil war. They and their culture were suppressed during the Franco years. After Franco’s death, they joined the new, democratic Spain as an autonomous region. But many Catalans, particularly on the political left, still wanted national independence; and this desire has grown over the decades. In 2006, matters came to a head when the Catalan parliament issued a new “statute of autonomy” for Catalonia, which was then overruled and modified by the Spanish parliament in Madrid.

The People’s Party, a right wing Spanish party which has been in power since 2011, but back in 2006 was in opposition, challenged the statute further in the Spanish constitutional court. When the court gave its verdict in 2010, it declared several of the articles in the already weakened statute to be unconstitutional. The results? More than a million people marched in protest in Barcelona. A series of symbolic referendums on independence were held in various parts of Catalonia. In 2014, a full referendum on independence was planned by the Catalans. The Spanish government tried to block the poll, but the Catalans went ahead with it anyway. It resulted in an overwhelming vote for independence, but a low turn-out. It seems that most of those opposed to independence boycotted the poll.

And so to 1st October 2017, the date set by the Catalan parliament for a binding referendum on independence, with a single simple question to be answered Yes or No: “Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state in the form of a republic?” The Spanish government, having already declared the referendum to be illegal, sent thousands of Spanish police to Catalonia. On the day, they raided polling stations, and used strong-arm tactics in an attempt to stop the poll. Several hundred people, along with some police, were injured in these raids.

But these police tactics didn’t manage to stop the poll. As in 2014, there was a big majority in favour of independence, but a low turn-out. It looks as if, again, most potential No voters stayed home; and it’s easy to understand why. During the following week, there were demonstrations in Barcelona both for and against independence. The consensus among pollsters seems to be that the population of Catalonia as a whole is split roughly down the middle on the issue.

My reaction is sympathy for those Catalans who want independence. For, other things being equal, a smaller political unit is more likely to deliver better and more responsive government to its people than a larger one. And the larger the number and the smaller the size of the political units in an area, the easier it is for people who find themselves oppressed in one place to find another place more congenial to them. People in the USA have known this for decades; if you don’t like California, you can move to Nevada or Texas.

But my sympathy for the Catalan separatists has been bolstered by recent events. For first, people have been subjected to strong-arm tactics for doing no more than expressing their views on the subject. And second, the Spanish government has acted, for many years now, in a high-handed way that is totally dismissive of the Catalans and their aspirations. While claiming that Spain is a democratic country, they have treated, and are continuing to treat, the Catalans in an undemocratic manner.

The problem

The way the current Spanish political system is, there’s no possibility of compromise on this issue. Catalan independence (or not) is an all or nothing decision, and whichever way it eventually goes, the losers will be angry. And even more so if there is evidence of bad faith in the matter by some of those concerned, such as the Spanish government.

It seems to me to be a major failing of democracy that it puts people into these all-or-nothing, polarizing situations. And the results can often be decided by a very slim margin. Last year’s Brexit vote in the UK, and Donald Trump’s election as US president, are examples. In both cases, the losers were (and still are) fuming and scheming. Yet, at least, people did get some kind of say in those decisions. Whereas the Catalan separatists are being denied a voice entirely. (Of course, I should add, Brexit isn’t done and dusted yet. And it may yet be that it’s those of us who voted Leave who will have reason to end up very, very angry).

Actually, democracy is often even worse than that. Political parties set out their stalls and their agendas, to tempt those they think are likely to vote for them. And when they get power, they seek to implement these agendas good and hard. Usually, they also do lots of other bad things they didn’t tell us about. Democracy has, in effect, transmuted the out of date doctrine of the “divine right of kings to rule” into a right of politicians and political parties to force their agendas on to people who don’t want them.

Where parties differ on policies, this often leads to a see-saw effect, with alternating periods of good and bad for the supporters of one party, or bad and good for everyone else. This leads to polarization of views among different groups of people. But where the parties agree on issues, it’s worse yet. When all the main parties support the same bad policies, such as heavy taxation or the green agenda, then everyone is subjected to them, and the people have no come-back. That can only lead to the people and the political class becoming polarized against each other. Thus any country, that uses “democracy” in its current form, will become more and more divided, and in the end is likely either to fall apart, or to descend into civil war or tyranny.

The solution

How to deal with these problems? I’m certainly not going to put forward monarchy or oligarchy as a solution. The EU and the UN have been steps in completely the wrong direction; they should be abolished. Fiddling with democracy within nations – proportional representation, and the like – doesn’t seem to address the real problems. Nor, I think, does anarchism offer any way forward.

But I think there’s a way out of the trap we’re all in. What we need to do is de-politicize government. We need to get rid of Big Politics and its agendas, and simply let people pick their friends and run their own lives in their own ways. We need to make a world of live and let live.

How could we do this? Well, part of the solution must be smaller governmental units. That’s why Brexit and Catalan independence are important. But they are only the first steps on the road. Devolving power to smaller and smaller units, like Swiss cantons or even individual towns and villages, is a necessary part of the fix. I think it may also have a side benefit of preventing concentration of military power, and so lowering the likelihood of warlike aggressions.

The other part of the solution is more radical. We need a way of deciding conflicts between individuals and groups from different jurisdictions. We need something which can function between individuals and groups as international law is supposed to between nations.

What can fulfil this function, I think, is a generally understood and agreed code which people should follow in their interactions with people and groups outside the particular societies they belong to. I call this the “convivial code.” (“Convivial” means “living together.” In my use of this word, I follow the Belgian philosopher Frank van Dun.)

The convivial code, I think, will be simple and fairly brief. Here’s my shot at an outline of it. First, it will require each of us to respect the rights and freedoms of all those who themselves respect others’ rights and freedoms. Including such rights as life, security of person, property and privacy, and freedoms such as those of religion, thought and opinion, association and movement. Second, it will aim to provide objective justice for all, which I see as the condition in which no-one is treated, over the long run and in the round, worse than he or she treats others. Third, it will place on each of us a responsibility to compensate anyone to whom we do objective harm, if they ask for it. Fourth, it will require each of us to do all we can to fulfil our side of contracts we voluntarily enter into, as long as the other parties do the same. And fifth, if we choose to have children, it will require us to bring them up and educate them until they are able to function as adult human beings and to behave
according to the convivial code.

I envisage that, within limits, societies will be able to add to or vary the convivial code for the conduct of their members, as they see fit. Thus socialists or anarchists who don’t accept the idea of private property, for example, will be able to impose communal ownership of property within their communes. But the convivial code won’t allow them to do what socialist politicians do today, and forcibly take away the earnings of those who don’t want to be in a socialist commune.

In the long run, I think we can reach a position where all government is decentralized and local. Governments will continue to use the forms of law of their particular countries or regions. Societies of all kinds – including local communities, religious societies and businesses – will be able to legislate their own rules for members. And these may, and in many cases will, include some form of democracy, or voting to select the society’s leaders or the policies that the society will follow.

But all interactions between societies or their members, and people or groups outside, will be governed everywhere by the convivial code alone. It will not be allowed for any group to impose their agenda on anyone else; for such an imposition violates the convivial code. Thus, no-one will be forced to live under any political or religious ideology they don’t like. And any conduct which violates the convivial code – for example, the recent actions of Spanish police and politicians over Catalonia – will be judged by an apolitical and unbiased court, and compensation ordered or criminal punishment meted out as may prove appropriate.

In such a world, the Catalans would not have to decide between being politically independent and being part of Spain. Those who feel a strong Catalan identity could join the Catalan Society. And those who prefer strong contacts with those in other parts of Spain could join the Spanish Friendship Society. (Some might even join both!) Neither group would need to give up their identity or their preferences for the sake of the other. And both would behave towards each other in a convivial manner, not a political one.

A radical idea? Yes. A naïve idea? Maybe. A workable idea? I very much hope so. A popular idea? That’s up to you.

Saturday, 16 September 2017

Book Review: Cosmopolitanism, by Kwame Anthony Appiah

Although it was first published in 2006, I only recently became aware of this book. One advantage of being so late to the party is that I had plenty of reviews to look at, and so could judge what others think of the book before trying it. And the judgements were varied and interesting. Many of them, indeed, told me as much about the reviewers as they did about the book itself. Those on the political left tended to be dismissive of both its substance and its style. Of the rest, some seemed bemused by it, but many were enthusiastic. So, as the subject is in an area of great interest to me, I decided to read the book and add my twopennyworth.

Kwame Anthony Appiah is certainly well qualified as a cosmopolitan. Born in London of aristocratic Ghanaian and politically connected English parents, he was brought up in Ghana and schooled in England, then studied philosophy at Clare College, Cambridge. As he is a year younger than I am, his time there probably overlapped my own at Trinity College a couple of hundred yards away. Since then, he has spent most of his working life in US universities, and is currently a professor at New York University. And he is sufficiently well accepted in establishment circles that in 2016 he was invited to give the BBC’s Reith Lectures.

The book is not long. It has less than 200 pages of text, excluding references and index. For the most part, I found Appiah’s writing style excellent; straightforward and clear, and even the longest sentences read easily. He is no Germanic bafflegabber or bullshitting postmodernist! The one exception was the chapter on moral positivism, which did leave me a bit cold.

A cosmopolitan, Appiah tells us, is one who thinks of himself or herself as a citizen of the world, rather than of a particular city or country. He traces the idea back to the ancient Greek Cynics and Stoics, and mentions its influence on the Enlightenment. Indeed, in Tom Paine’s “my country is the world, and my religion is to do good” from that time, I find a fine statement of cosmopolitan sentiment. And Appiah says that cosmopolitanism begins from: “habits of coexistence: conversation in its older meaning, of living together, association.”

I confess I find this idea of cosmopolitanism rather attractive. Partly because over the decades my work has taken me, for periods of months or more, to places like the Netherlands, the USA, Indonesia, Italy and Australia; and I enjoyed most of them. And partly because the idea holds out hope of a way forward from the current, failed political system of nation states and super-states.

In the Introduction to the book, the basic ideas of cosmopolitanism come thick and fast. That we have obligations to others, which go beyond our kin or our fellow-countrymen. That people are different, and the differences are worth exploring. That there's no necessary conflict between local tastes or customs and a universal morality. That “we neither expect nor desire that every person or every society should converge on a single mode of life.” That we shouldn’t expect everyone to become a cosmopolitan; there will always be hold-outs. That “there are some values that are, and should be, universal, just as there are lots of values that are, and must be, local.”

The first two chapters of the main part of the book, in comparison, I found disappointing. On the first chapter, indeed, I made only one note. That was an apparent small error: “recognition of our responsibility for every human being.” At which I thought, surely he means to every human being? Responsibility for the conduct of everyone on the planet would be a heavy cross to bear.

The second chapter, the one which aims to knock down moral relativism and positivism, I found the hardest going by far. I had hoped for strong, clear arguments in support of the existence of both universal and local moral values. After all, this corresponds very closely to my own ethical view. I found myself disappointed.

On to the third chapter, on facts. Now, I’m a believer in the objectivity of truth. For me, a particular truth or fact may be unknown, or poorly understood, or wrongly apprehended, or disputable, at a particular time. But all truths can, in principle at least, be discovered. The scientific method is the best way we’ve found so far of finding out truths about our physical surroundings. And it’s helpful in seeking truths in other areas such as economics – though it can’t always do these things on its own. If that makes me a positivist in Appiah’s terms, so be it.

I do, in fact, agree with Appiah that believers in witchcraft don’t deserve to be singled out for criticism as irrational; though they may deserve sanctions for what they do to those they believe to be witches! But this, for me, is merely because religion is by its nature not amenable to reason. Religion, I find, is a thought process that exists right down at the level of metaphysics or basic world-view, thus below the level of the rational mind. Therefore in religion, tolerance is the only sane attitude.

But when I come to Duhem and Hanson, and opposing views on scientific thinking, Appiah doesn’t manage to persuade me out of my putative positivism. For me, there are many reasons why scientists may disagree on facts. They may include ambition, confirmation bias or politics. And when, at the end of the chapter, Appiah says that nothing guarantees that we can reach agreement on facts, I respond: That’s because facts and perceptions of facts are different things.

The chapter on moral disagreement is where the book starts to get really interesting. I liked the discussion of “thin” and “thick” moral concepts. And the example of the matrilineal society, achieving the same moral value (good parenting) by a different means from the Western nuclear family, is a very good one. The discussion of taboo is also good.

On the Golden Rule, I have a difference with Appiah. He correctly calls out the standard negative form of the rule for failing to take into account that the values or tastes of the person, to whom you’re deciding whether you may do something, may be different from yours. It may be OK, for example, to whip a masochist, but not to whip a normal person. But he doesn’t mention the far more serious flaw in the positive form of the rule – at least, in the Christian version which he quotes. This is that, taken literally, this form of the rule requires you to act well towards others, even when they act badly towards you. An extreme interpretation would, for example, forbid you from using violence to defend yourself against an attacker.

The next chapter, “The Primacy of Practice,” puts forward the idea that we can often agree on what is to be regarded as right and wrong, even if we don’t agree on the reasons why. This is good, because it greatly increases the chances of agreeing on which moral rules should be core (Kant’s universal maxims, as discussed in the previous chapter). But there will always be moral issues on which differences cause deep divisions – abortion and gay marriage are cases in point.

“Imaginary Strangers” answers a variety of questions about and objections to the cosmopolitan idea. I’ll comment on only one. Some make out that people can only care about those with whom they share some kind of identity, for example national or religious. And that such an identity always requires an out-group as well as an in-group. But for cosmopolitans, for whom the in-group is “humanity,” there can be no out-group. Appiah answers this objection by stressing the importance of shared identities between individuals, rather than dividing everyone into groups; and I agree with his point. But in my view, there's another and much stronger answer. There is in fact an out-group; the enemies of humanity. Back in the chapter against positivism, Appiah identifies one proterotype of this group as “the Tormentor,” someone that thinks it is good to be cruel. But for me, the out-group is wider than this. It consists of those that fail, seriously or persistently, to live up to basic standards of humanity – the core moral rules that distinguish human behaviour from sub-human. (Elsewhere, I’ve called them “disconvivials.”) In terms of specific individuals, it has included Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot and many others I won’t name.

On “Cosmopolitan Contamination,” I’ll again offer only one comment. That is to quote Appiah on preserving diverse cultures: “There is no place for the enforcement of diversity by trapping people within a kind of difference they long to escape.” To that I say, Amen.

In “Whose Culture Is It, Anyway?” Appiah addresses the taking of cultural relics from one culture by another, and the calls for restitution that we hear so often. And, it seems to me, his position on this matter – not even to try to demand everything back, for marketing reasons – is very reasonable.

In “The Counter-Cosmopolitans” he discusses a group of religious, and particularly Muslim, enemies of cosmopolitanism – “neofundamentalists,” he calls them. And he warns against the wrong kind of universalism or uniformity. “Universalism without toleration,” he says, “turns easily to murder.” But he also makes it clear that there are limits to cosmopolitan tolerance. “Everybody matters; that is our central idea. And it sharply limits the scope of our tolerance.”

In the final chapter, “Kindness to Strangers,” Appiah demolishes the ideas of philosophers who think that everyone should give away most of their money and property to “good causes” like Oxfam and UNICEF. And in passing, he dismisses the idea of world government: “It could easily accumulate uncontrollable power, which it might use to do great harm; it would often be unresponsive to local needs; and it would almost certainly reduce the variety of institutional experimentation from which all of us can learn.”

I generally agree with the views expressed in this chapter, though on a couple of things I would go further. Firstly, for me the obligations of human beings to others divide into two types, negative and positive. We should fulfil the negative obligations, such as not supporting warlike aggressions against innocent people, to everyone without exception. But for the positive obligations, given that we have limited resources, it is up to us how and whom we decide to help. Giving to UNICEF rather than going to the opera, an example Appiah uses, might actually be a very bad thing if the result is that the opera company has to close for lack of business. Secondly, while I entirely agree with Appiah’s stance against world government, I think that his arguments can just as well be applied to many national governments; and to the EU, too.

To sum up. There are some very fine ideas and expositions in this book, despite a few chapters that are relatively dull. There’s much food for thought, too. One impression I had, though, is that Appiah does sometimes seem to pull his punches. It’s only in the last chapter that he stops jabbing and really unleashes the left (or right) hook. But that’s probably because he values his status among the establishment, and doesn’t want to make too many enemies!

The book is available on Amazon now for a little less than its cover price of £10.99. It’s worth the read, if only for a different perspective from those we usually encounter in Western liberal philosophical and political writing. And it may turn out, once I’ve digested the ideas a bit further, to have been worth more than that. For now, I’ll give it four stars out of five.

Friday, 8 September 2017

Political community and the Anti-Enlightenment

It’s plain that there’s a lot wrong in politics today. Our prosperity, our lifestyles, our rights and freedoms and our sanity are all under assault by the political class and their hangers on. So today I’ll ask: What has gone wrong?

I’ll state my conclusions up front. I see two strands of mishap, which together have led to the present situation. The first is weakening of the bonds that ought to hold political communities together. This, I think, has led to the decline and consequent failure of the nation state as a political system. It has also aided the rise of internationalist and globalist schemes, such as the European Union and the United Nations.

The second strand is a climate of thought, shared by many in the political class and among their cronies, which rejects the values of the 17th- and 18th-century Enlightenment. It rejects ideas like human progress, reason and science, objective truth, universal natural law, tolerance of difference, and the rights and freedoms of the human individual. Instead, it resists progress, denies the value of facts and rational thought, promotes moral relativism, and aims to politicize everything and to impose a suffocating conformism on everyone.

Along with this anti-Enlightenment backlash goes an activist agenda, that seeks to force authoritarian policies on all of us. Its proponents include: A global cadre of unaccountable élites. Most intellectuals in the humanities, and many in medicine and the sciences. Most of those that self identify as environmentalists. Feminists, social justice warriors and other practitioners of identity politics. Socialists, fascistic types, and wannabe totalitarians. Petty tyrants and jobsworths, that get their kicks out of making life difficult for people. Many, if not most, in the mainstream media. And the great majority of politicians, of all factions.

While some like to call this agenda “cultural Marxism,” in my view it’s rather broader than that. I see it as mixing elements of three political ideologies: socialism/communism, fascism and conservatism. If I had to pick a single word to encapsulate it, I’d call it illiberalism.

Individual, partnership and family

I’ll begin my account of political community with the smallest community of all; the individual.

Human beings are individuals. That’s a biological fact. Each of us has our own body and our own mind. And yet, we are social too. Man is a convivial animal. Convivial literally means “living together.” But it has also a secondary meaning of living well together. It’s in our nature to live together, and to build communities and societies for mutual benefit.

The smallest multi-person society is the partnership, and specifically the partnership of two. Two adults of opposite sexes can provide the zygote, if you will, from which a family can develop. The resulting “nuclear” family, of two parents and their children, is the canonical formulation of the next social unit up the scale. Beyond this, individuals can form and can join societies for many other purposes, like recreation, wealth generation and mutual defence.

The individual is the fundamental unit, from which all societies are built. And the family is of fundamental importance, too. For the family is the smallest social unit which can survive indefinitely. Moreover, it’s important to note that the individual and the family are different in kind from all other social units, because they are not voluntary. Each of us is born with a particular combination of characteristics, of talents and disabilities, of strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, each of us is born into a family, which has its own traits, both good and bad. In both cases it’s up to us, as individuals, to make the best we can of the hand we are dealt.

Bands and tribes

Long ago, when we were hunter-gatherers, the primary social institution beyond the family was the band. Bands consisted of several families, often closely related and usually numbering a few dozen people. And the organization was generally loose; while the band’s elders were valued for their advice, there was no formal power structure.

The primary forces, which bound the band together, were biological kinship and shared interest in finding food. These would have given the members of the band a sense of common purpose or community; and would have led them to co-operate in hunting. For example: “You flush the birds out of hiding, and I’ll kill them.” But they would also have had ties of mutual provision, or trade. Not merely at the level of: “You scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours.” But also, as Adam Smith put it: “Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want.”

Thus, the binding forces of a band are three: kinship, community and trade. There are ties of kinship from the individual to the family, and from the family to the band. There are ties of community, which bind each individual to the band as a whole, and vice versa. And there are ties of trade between the individual and other individuals and groups, in both directions.

Sometimes, bands would join together into larger units, commonly called tribes. They might have a formal group of elders, making decisions on behalf of the whole tribe. For example, on where to go to maximize the chance of finding prey at a particular time of year. And particularly among larger tribes, they might be ruled over by a headman and his advisors. Such systems are still used today in some traditional African societies.

When a tribe was well led, this could provide it with a fourth binding force, of leadership. The members of the tribe would acquire respect, and perhaps even love, for the individual or individuals who led their tribe, and brought it success.

Religion

Another binding force in a tribal society may be a shared religion. The people of the early tribes usually believed in many gods. And, one presumes, each tribe would have had its own set of gods, differing in one way or another from those of other tribes. They also had a priesthood, an early example of a privileged class. These officiated at the festivals which were held in honour of the gods; but they also often performed skilled services, like medicine and counselling.

In such societies, religion could supply a fifth binding force, beyond kinship, community, trade and leadership. The gods, interpreted by the priesthood, would have strongly influenced the conduct of individuals within the tribe. And they would also have had a strong effect on the headmen or elders, and so on the conduct of the tribe as a whole.

Land and people

About twelve and a half thousand years ago, a great change took place. Groups of people, in several parts of the world, abandoned the traditional hunting and gathering. Instead, each group settled down in one place, and began to cultivate crops and to domesticate animals.

When conditions were benign, the new approach allowed the populations of these groups to increase. The result was the rise of the Neolithic village. But not every year brought a good harvest to every village. In such times, groups that were short of food would seek to use force to take for themselves the product of the labours of other villages. Thus was unleashed on humanity the scourge of war.

Now, a political state isn’t an inevitable result of social systems like the villages of Neolithic times. Indeed, the earliest states only appeared several thousand years after the Neolithic revolution. Nevertheless, the territorial state seems to be an attractor point, towards which political societies are drawn.

There are several theories as to how the first states came about. Of these, Robert Carneiro’s seems to me as believable as any. Where arable land was scarce and its area circumscribed, when there was famine and so wars between villages, the losers could no longer flee to a new territory. The conquerors would soon have worked out that they were better off if they didn’t exterminate the defeated. Instead, they subjected these villages to taxation in the form of their produce.

This had two consequences. First, the size of the political unit increased, from one village to many. And second, within such a unit there would have arisen two classes. A ruling class, formed of the strongest warriors and their cronies and hangers on; and a productive class, subjected to the ruling class. The state was up and running.

As time passed, a variety of social structures evolved. But most had one thing in common. That is, that power was in the hands of a small, élite minority, who did not contribute to food production, and thus had to be supported by the labours of the ordinary people. Furthermore, in many cases accession to the élite was hereditary. More often than not, there was a single individual at the top of the pile – a chieftain or king. And the chieftain was surrounded by an aristocracy of senior members of select families.

Those chieftains who ruled and judged well, and benefited the group members as well as the group as a whole, would have been seen as great leaders. So, despite the inequality pervasive in such a society, people in these chiefdoms would still have felt bound to the group and to its leaders. And they would also have felt an attachment to the territory of the chiefdom, and even more to the particular parcel of land which they farmed. Thus, their society would have acquired a sixth binding force, which I’ll call proximity. And individuals would have acquired a strong sense of we; a love of our land and of our people, or what we would today call patriotism.

The city state

The city state of ancient Greece was a great advance on what preceded it. It was the environment in which the first codes of law, and some of the first examples of money, were introduced. The city state began as a mutual defence society. Indeed, it was a community in the sense of the Latin com- and munire, meaning “sharing fortifications.” But it went further. For, inside the walls of a city state, there was time and opportunity to experiment with ways of organizing the society.

Each city state was different. Each had its own culture and values. Athens, for example, had a culture which valued rational thought. And it encouraged skilled and talented foreigners to settle there. Aristotle was one such. Furthermore, it had a system called democracy, in which all members of the privileged class of full citizens could speak and vote in the assembly, and so have a say in the doings of the city as a whole. Sparta, on the other hand, was a militaristic oligarchy, closed to most foreigners, and not allowing its own people to travel.

But there were similarities between the city states, too. Wars among city states were in those times all but endemic. All the city states relied on the institution of slavery. While many cities in theory allowed political rights to all male property owners, in practice only a minority of the residents had full political rights. And the cities, like the earlier chiefdoms, were often dominated by aristocratic clans. Yet in its heyday, the city state was seen as like a family. And those without full rights, even women, slaves and immigrants, nevertheless felt bound to the people and the culture of the city they lived in.

Thus the city state added, to the six binding forces of kinship, community, trade, leadership, religion and proximity, a seventh: a shared culture and a shared set of values. The people of a city would have felt attachment to their culture, and to the values which it promoted.

Cultural nationalism

I’ll skip now over approaching two millennia, to the beginnings of nationalism. I’ve heard it said that scholars place the origin of nationalism anywhere between the 8th and the 18th centuries. I put my own pin firmly in the middle of that period, at the end of the 13th century. And I credit the Welsh with being the first nationalists. For, once Edward had conquered them, they knew they were no match for the English on the battlefield. So they made the best of a bad job, treasuring their culture and their language rather than political ambitions.

Something similar happened with the Scots, although their brand of nationalism was more Gaelic than Scottish. The English and the French, too, were not immune from such feelings; probably because for many centuries they were at so often each other’s throats. And so, gradually, senses of nationhood and civil society grew among different populations in Europe.

The Westphalian nation state

By the 16th century, there was a problem. With the split between Catholicism and Protestantism, religion had not only lost its ability to bind people together, but had become a disruptive force. The solution to this seemed to be separate those of different religions into different territories, on the model of cuius religio, eius religio.

In such an atmosphere, fresh ideas were needed. Enter Frenchman Jean Bodin, and his concept of sovereignty. In Bodin’s scheme, the sovereign prince has many powers over the people within his state or territory. He has power to make laws to bind them. To make war and peace. To appoint the principal officers of the state. To be the final judge of appeals, and to pardon those convicted if he so desires. To issue a currency, to levy taxes and impose duties, and to exempt those he wishes from such taxes or duties. Further, the sovereign prince is above the law. He isn’t bound by any of the laws he makes, he bears no responsibility for his actions, and he is only accountable to God, not to any human being.

One can be forgiven for thinking that Bodin merely took up where Machiavelli had left off, and that his scheme is no more than a recipe for tyranny; as it indeed has often proven to be. Bodin was, after all, mainly seeking to increase the power of the French monarchy. However, he did make it clear that the acts of a sovereign prince must always be based on justice and natural reason. And that such a prince is always subject to what he calls the law of God and nature.

By the 17th century, Bodin’s scheme had become the basis of the “Westphalian” nation state. Such a state claims sovereignty over a territory, and a right to order all affairs within it. It claims rights to make laws, to go to war, to tax, to be the final arbiter within the territory. And – though many will try to deny it – state functionaries still retain, to a greater or lesser extent, immunity from responsibility for acts carried out on the state’s behalf.

Even today (parliaments, democracy, bills of rights, constitutions and other bags on the side – even the EU and UN – notwithstanding) this is still the primary form of political structure in the world. Yet in terms of binding forces, the Westphalian nation state adds nothing beyond those of the city state of old: kinship, community, trade, leadership, religion, proximity and culture.

The Enlightenment

The Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries affected primarily the European Christian cultures, and those derived from them. It was not, at the time, a world-wide phenomenon. Though it spread to the Jews within a few decades, and its knock-on effects reached places like Japan and much of the Islamic world during the 19th century. However, its ideals set the tone, over two centuries and more, for most human societies.

The Enlightenment freed human minds from shackles both religious and political. It promoted ideas of advancement and human progress. And it supported a belief in the inherent goodness of the human mind. One of the most fundamental Enlightenment ideas was that of reason; that is, thinking in orderly, rational ways, and of using logic to build and to judge mental models of reality. The Enlightenment celebrated reason, and the independent use of it by human beings. And it brought to the fore the idea of reasonable thinking, argument and behaviour – not extreme, not excessive, but in accordance with reason.

Another fundamental idea was that truth is objective, independently of what people happen to think about particular truths. And as a result, we can discover truths; we can use our reason to build up as objective as possible a picture of the world around us. Therefore, the Enlightenment put a high value on rational thought; and on the scientific method, which uses observations, hypotheses, experimentation, reason and logic to seek to build an objective view of our surroundings. Further, it encouraged the application of reason to areas of thought beyond the physical and scientific, including ethics, politics and economics.

In religion, many Enlightenment thinkers sought to make the exercise of faith less confrontational than in earlier times, and so promoted religious tolerance. Others went further, seeking to lessen the political power of organized religion, or even to eradicate religious authority entirely.

In politics, the Enlightenment brought the idea of a civil order based on natural law. Along with this came ideas such as the natural rights and natural equality of all human beings. Of a social contract, to enable people to live together in a civil society and to protect their natural rights. Of individual liberty, and the right to do whatever isn’t explicitly prohibited. And of freedom of opinion, speech and thought. The new practical ideas in politics included: constitutional government, separation of powers, separation of church and state, and that government must be for the benefit of and with the consent of the governed. On the more radical margins, these ideas even included some kind of democracy, and a government of laws, not of men.

In economics, Enlightenment thinkers laid the groundwork for the Industrial Revolution. They sought to promote the market mechanism and what became laissez faire capitalism. And at around the same time, the development of colonies by several European powers began the long process of breaking down barriers of culture, language, geography and religion.

A time of revolutions

Good ideas have consequences. And these were no exception to the rule. The American Revolution was perhaps the embodiment of Enlightened politics; though its roots can be seen in the earlier ideas of John Locke, who had helped to secure the Glorious Revolution in England.

The French Revolution, on the other hand, went badly sour. Though starting with high ideals of individual liberty, equality and fraternity, it de-generated into a tyranny. What seems to have happened is that, in their eagerness to up-end the existing order, the revolutionaries tried to use the political state to do it. That’s like trying to fight fire with fire. And the results – bloodshed, war and eventually dictatorship – should have been predictable.

As to the causes of the failure, scholars differ. But there’s a point of view, in which I find some weight, that the revolution became corrupted away from its own professed values because some of its philosophical leaders were not quite what they appeared to be. I’m thinking in particular of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The more I read about the man, the less I like him. Certainly his conception of a social contract, in which individuals must surrender their rights and be forced to obey the “general will,” is far more collectivist than John Locke’s idea of people voluntarily forming a society to protect their rights. There’s a case to be made that, far from being a progressive and a supporter of individual rights, Rousseau was actually a big-government shill.

Political nationalism

Whatever one may think of the French Revolution, one thing it did was inspire people to look for a political set-up, which could satisfy the desires and interests of individuals as well as of the group as a whole. Thus were born the modern ideas of nationalism and the nation state. The idea of popular sovereignty, too, grew out of the revolutionary ideals. No longer were people willing to kow-tow to the arbitrary dictates of some king or ruling class. Instead, they sought to allow every member of the community a say in how the nation was ruled.

But political nationalism had many negatives, too. Religion and culture, which had originally been binding forces, could easily become divisive and destructive. Political societies were larger than those of earlier times. So, divisions could easily appear between classes with different aims and aspirations. Worse, the idea of “my country, right or wrong” placed the nation, and so the state, above moral principles; even those like “Thou shalt not kill.” And so, nationalism spawned wars. And wars enabled the state steadily to increase its powers over people.

Three centuries of ideology

In Enlightenment times, there were in essence just two political ideologies: liberalism and conservatism. Liberalism – what we would now call classical liberalism – was a bottom-up view of politics. Liberals saw the institution of society, and therefore political societies, as being for the benefit of each individual. And they promoted the new, progressive ideas of reason, tolerance and natural rights. Conservatives, on the other hand, took a top-down view. They saw the state, and its powerful élites such as kings, nobles and church leaders, as possessing both authority and immunity from being held to account. And they resisted change, seeking to preserve the existing order both religious and political. Along, of course, with their own privileged positions in it.

Things became more complicated in the early 19th century, with the advent of socialism. One of the difficulties in discussing socialism is that there is no clear, widely accepted definition of it. For some, it means collective ownership and control over the means of producing, distributing and exchanging goods. For others, it means a social organization with an egalitarian distribution of wealth, and no such thing as private property. My 1928 dictionary calls it the “principle that individual liberty should be completely subordinated to the interests of the community with the deductions that can be drawn from it e.g. the State ownership of land & capital.” One thing all socialists seem to share, however, is a burning desire for political change in a socialist direction.

To be fair to them, the earliest socialists weren’t all top-down statists. Often, they sought to create model communities, bound together by shared ideology. Robert Owen’s community at New Harmony, Indiana was an example. Of course, most – if not all – of these communities failed. And so, by the 20th century, socialism had degenerated into a militant collectivism, in which Society and the socialist agenda are paramount, and the individual is of no significance.

Another ideology, which began to grow at much the same time as early socialism, was anarchism. The distinguishing feature of anarchism is its opposition to the state and to political government. Anarchists prefer to associate into non-hierarchical communities, each with its own style. And in many cases, these styles run parallel to those favoured by socialists. But the big difference between anarchists and socialists is that most anarchists don’t want to force their ideology on anyone outside their own communities. Except, of course, for those 19th century anarchists, who sought to use violence to get rid of the state and its ruling class.

Then came Marxism and communism. Marxism claimed to be scientific socialism – an attempt to apply the scientific method to social and political ideas. But the results, when it was put into practice, were not good: famines, massacres and mass deportations, to name but three. And the Marxists saw capitalism – that is, ownership of property and of the means of production by individuals and by voluntarily formed groups – as a system that led, not to prosperity, but to systematic inequality and instability. Supporters of Marxism and communism therefore sought to overthrow the capitalist system, and to impose state control on the economy.

That had two bad effects, at least. First, the Marxist promotion of class war between working people and the (not very well defined) classes they called “capitalists” and “bourgeoisie” wasn’t very helpful in binding people together, was it? And state control over the economy weakened, bit by bit, one of the most important binding forces of all; trade between individuals.

Yet, while Marxists predicted that the state would wither away, they also set out to capture the state and to use it to achieve their objectives! No wonder communism turned out to be so evil. No wonder the societies it led to were ruled by small minorities that brutally oppressed everyone else. No wonder communism caused nearly a hundred million unnecessary human deaths.

Also closely associated with socialism is egalitarianism. In its weak form, it seeks equality of opportunity; in which all individuals can achieve preferment according to their demonstrated abilities, not based on – for example – race, religion, gender or nepotism. But many egalitarians today favour a stronger version of this idea; equality of outcome. That is, similar rewards for all, regardless of talents or application. Egalitarians, therefore, hate able people, particularly those who develop their talents to the full. And most of all, they hate individuals who are economically competent and independent. Yet they seem blind to the fact that to enforce such an equality requires extreme inequality in political power. As Friedrich von Hayek put it: “A claim for equality of material position can be met only by a government with totalitarian powers."

Then came fascism. In some ways, it’s hard to separate fascism from communism. In their heydays, both shared an attachment to dictatorial power, extinguishing individual freedom, forcible suppression of opposition, social indoctrination and a lack of ethical restraints on the state. But in some respects, fascists went further. They hated anyone who was different, particularly in race. They sought to make groups of people into scapegoats, and wanted to purge those they considered to be inferior, such as Jews. They valued duty and discipline, glorified violence and war, and gave hero status to the ideal of the warrior. On the other hand, fascists didn’t so much want to destroy the capitalist system, as to turn it to their own advantage. It was possible to get rich under fascism, but only for those that unceasingly sought to increase the power and well-being of the fascist state.

In the course of the 20th century, other evil ideologies also sought to establish themselves in various parts of the world. Notable among them have been racism, as in apartheid South Africa and Idi Amin’s Uganda; theocracy, as in Iran; and dictatorship, as in North Korea. Each of these ideologies was and is, at root, a perversion of one of the binding forces of human societies. Racism is a perversion of kinship, theocracy of religion, and dictatorship of leadership.

Then there’s welfarism, also known as nanny-statism, an ideology which led the ruling class to try to bribe people into believing that the state is a benefit to them. They set up elaborate, re-distributory schemes for welfare, or health, or education, or whatever else was flavour of the month. And they commandeered the resources necessary to implement these schemes. But the main effect of such schemes has been to drag down into dependence on the state many who, if allowed the chance, would have been well able to prosper through their own efforts.

Moreover, every nett benefit to a Paul or Paula must be paid for by some Peter. And Peter must also pay for the bureaucracy that maladministers the system, and the politically connected cronies that feed off it. Thus welfarism, far from helping the poor as its supporters claim, actually re-distributes wealth from the politically poor to the politically rich. Worse, Paul and Paula don’t know that Peter is the one who is providing for them. And so Peter doesn’t receive, for his pains, any thanks or appreciation at all. Thus welfarism weakens the bonds of trade, community, proximity and even kinship, which should have held together Peters and Paulas, Pauls and Petras. And it impoverishes both its apparent beneficiaries and their reluctant benefactors. That isn’t a sustainable set-up.

Then there are warfarism and its comrade, the security state. A warfarist state behaves like a school bully towards those outside it, and often towards those inside it too. It seeks to interfere in people’s affairs, in ways almost always damaging to those affected. It instigates “war on drugs,” “war on terror” and the like. It seeks any excuse to use its military forces. And often, while decrying terrorism, it encourages – and even carries out – terrorist acts. At the same time, it pries into people’s lives, and monitors and records their actions in ever increasing detail. And like fascism, it often seeks to make scapegoats out of people who may (or may not) have committed some small misdeed or irresponsibility in their past.

Then there are feminism, affirmative action, the authoritarianism of “social justice warriors,” and other manifestations of what has come to be called identity politics. In this kind of politics, individuals identify themselves with groups who have, or have had in the past, some real or perceived grievance; women, gay people or black people, for example. And they advance political positions that seek to empower these groups relative to other people. At the same time, many of them seek to promote political correctness, and to stifle the freedom of speech of those who disagree with them. And they see people, not as people, but as members of groups. Thus the rights of the individual get lost in the noise.

Then there’s what I call social engineering fever. Those affected by this particular ailment seem to think that they possess a right to interfere in others’ lives, for no better purpose than their own social goals. These zealots like nothing better than to “intervene,” seeking to change people’s behaviour. Their targets range from users of drugs and prostitution, to smokers, alcohol and pop drinkers, car drivers and many more. And they are adept at using state dominated education and politically correct media to promote their nefarious schemes.

Environmentalism

But among today’s ideologies, pride of place for sheer evil goes to environmentalism and the green agenda. At one level, it’s a perverted religion. It worships the planet and “nature” as if they were gods, and shows contempt for human beings, both as individuals and as a species. At another level, environmentalism is like a mix of communism, fascism and conservatism.

The green agenda is like communism, in that it seeks to destroy our free market civilization, and to deny its fruits to the people of the world. But it also seeks to trash our Enlightenment heritage of reason and searching for truth. Its promoters spout lies, misrepresentations, bullshit and unfounded scares. They falsify past records to try to make their case. They misuse the scientific method, and present chicanery as if it was science. They call anyone who opposes them nasty names like “deniers.” They claim their science is settled, when in reality it is suspect or dubious, or at least highly uncertain. Many of them can’t, or won’t, debate the facts objectively. They invert the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, and require those they accuse to prove a negative.

The green agenda is like fascism, too, in that it seeks to take away our freedoms, and to impose on us arbitrary and ever tightening personal and collective limits on what we may do. Among much else, it wants to force us to: Stop smoking. Walk, cycle or use public transport instead of driving cars. Cram ourselves into compact cities and high-rises. Recycle religiously. And dismantle our affordable, reliable energy infrastructure, and replace it by energy that is expensive, intermittent and requires gigantic solar arrays or ugly, noisy wind farms. Moreover, the greens like to make scapegoats out of those who, through no fault of their own, have been led into actions deemed environmentally incorrect – for example, drivers of diesel cars.

But the green agenda is also ultra-conservative. Its promoters seem to fear any kind of change that isn’t part of their agenda – including “climate change.” They babble about “sustainable development,” but they don’t seem to want us to develop much at all. They want to destroy dynamism in Western economies, and to slow or halt human progress. Indeed, many of them want to force us back into a pre-industrial age. And they even try to make out that our activities are damaging the planet by extinguishing species – of whose very existence we can’t be certain!

What the greens actually want to force on us is not sustainability, but stasis. But stasis can never be sustainable. Indeed, stasis is death.

Democracy

Meanwhile in many countries, beginning in the mid 19th century there grew up an institution called democracy. But that’s a misnomer. For this scheme isn’t like Athenian democracy at all. It’s really just a sham.

Instead of having a real voice in political affairs, each of us is merely permitted to cast a vote for one (or occasionally more) of a field of candidates, that claim that if elected they will “represent” us (whatever that means). And these selections, totted up in more or less complicated ways, are used to determine which of a number of criminal gangs called political parties is to be granted licence to rule over us for the next several years.

I suppose that, initially, many people thought this system might give them a voice in how they were governed. This phase, which I call democracy-1, must have felt like something of a honeymoon period. But it wasn’t long before there emerged political factions, looking to take advantage of the situation; as James Madison warned way back in 1787.

In this phase, democracy-2, two factions (or, rarely, three or more) attract cores of support, and promote policies designed to favour their own supporters. People who don’t feel a strong attachment to one faction or another will tend to vote for whichever side seems less evil at the time. And this, as often as not, is the faction currently out of power. So, power tends to swing from one side to the other and back again. The social fabric becomes more and more stretched, and the tone of politics nastier and nastier.

But there’s worse. When a faction receives a democratic mandate, that gives an apparent legitimacy to whatever policies it promotes. So, democracy can easily arrive at the so called tyranny of the majority, in which 10 people can gang up on 9 people, and steal their resources through targeted taxation; or tell them what to do, however unreasonable, and back it up by threats of violence. Democracy-2 can even bring about the tyranny of a minority. For factions often acquire power, based on the support of less than a quarter of those eligible to vote.

What kind of labels do these factions pin on themselves? Some identify as liberals, yet their policies are anything but liberal. Most of them seem to be merely socialists that don’t have the guts to admit it. Some call themselves democrats, a code word for “we want to use the system to benefit our supporters at the expense of everyone else.” And “social democrats” are socialists to boot. Others – such as greens – call themselves progressives, yet their policies are fascistic and ultra-conservative. Meanwhile, many of those that bill themselves as conservatives turn out, on examination, to be warfarists, racists, religious zealots or some combination of these. None of the factions are what they claim to be. And none of them are worth voting for, anyway.

This system allows no voice at all to those who cherish Enlightenment values, or who are liberals or progressives in the true senses of those words. Nor, indeed, does it offer anything to those who simply want to mind their own businesses and live their lives in their own ways. Thus many who oppose socialism, fascism, welfarism and warfarism, the green agenda and the like, have felt impelled to vote for “conservative” politicians, thinking perhaps that they are the least of many evils. But regrettably, these voters are in error. For even the least of several evils is still an evil.

Meanwhile, in many places – particularly in Europe – democracy-2 has moved into the next stage, democracy-3. Here, different political factions may spout different rhetoric; and their policies may, perhaps, be a little different around the edges. But their ideologies are essentially the same. Welfarism and environmentalism, for example, are at the roots of the policies of almost all parties that have any realistic chance of power. Moreover, the system tends to elevate the worst, the most dishonest, devious and psychopathic, into positions of power. So, most policies in democracy-3 are directed to strengthening and expanding state power. They are made, not in the interests of the people, but to benefit the political class and their hangers-on, and to satisfy the agendas of special interest groups. Thus, under democracy-3, most of us are forced to live our lives under political ideologies that are distasteful or downright hostile towards us.

Further, democracy as it exists today has a dramatic negative effect on the binding forces of political societies. Leadership becomes perverted into the imposition of bad policies. Those, who suffer under the rule of political parties hostile to them, lose all sense of common purpose and community. For those that support harmful policies are, in effect, assaulting the victims of those policies; and in a particularly dishonest and cowardly way. Moreover, to the extent that the political state controls and distorts the economy, it also weakens the binding force of trade. And those, whose values conflict with the political correctness du jour, feel alienated from the culture they live in. Far from promoting social cohesion, today’s democracy destroys it.

There’s a fourth stage of democracy, too; already into some countries, like Greece. In democracy-4, the political state reaches a critical mass. Those dependent on the state, either for work or for benefits, become an absolute majority. Thus under democracy-4, a single interest bloc can forever outvote, and so oppress, everyone else. Democracy-4 is a terminal social illness.

The decline of religion

All this has been accompanied by a weakening of the binding force of religion. In and of itself, I’m not too concerned by the decline of religion, a credo which I outgrew at age 16. For I find religion to be a thought process that exists at a level lower than the rational mind. So, it isn’t amenable to reason. And therefore, the only sane attitude to religion is tolerance. Except, of course, towards those that want to browbeat or to force their own religious views on to others.

But the decline of religion has had, indirectly, a very great negative effect. For it has taken away the sense of accountability to a higher authority, which was supposed to restrain the conduct of those in power in the state. A godless sovereign prince has no-one to answer to. So he can do what he wants, however unjust or unreasonable. Moreover, a godless political state recognizes no limits to its authority. So it can do whatever seems expedient to the rulers, however evil and destructive it may be. Indeed, there’s a case to be made that, in the minds of many in the political class and among their hangers-on, the state itself has become a god.

The failure of the nation state

To sum up nation states and their politics today. We’re still using a 16th-century political system. Isn’t that crazy? We don’t use 16th- century medicine any more, or 16th-century farming techniques, or 16th-century transport. And we’ve been through the Enlightenment since then, for goodness’ sake! So why are we still suffering under a system that not only allows, but encourages, an élite to do to us exactly what it wants, with no accountability or come-back?

A government that does its job properly ought to be a benefit to every individual among the governed; real criminals excepted, of course. It should be like an impartial umpire. But today’s political governments drain fairly earned resources from people, and use them for selfish, immoral, destructive political schemes. They are no longer umpires, but have become vampires. We live today, not under John Adams’ vision of government of laws not of men, but under the rule of bad laws made by bad men.

The Westphalian nation state is out of date. It’s no longer fit for purpose; if, indeed, it ever was. Over time, it has atrophied the binding forces, like community, trade, leadership, proximity and culture, which ought to hold its people together. And democracy has not only failed to deliver its promise, but has made and is making things worse. Thus nothing remains to hold nation states together, except fear of being targeted by state violence or theft. That’s not sustainable.

Internationalism and globalism

The ruling élites know, of course, that nation states have lost most of their former ability to bind people together. So, they continue to seek new excuses to keep themselves in power and to increase their power. And these include international political schemes and globalization.

Back in 1999, the green socialist spinmaster Tony Blair spoke of a doctrine of international community, in which “we are all internationalists now.” The label “post-Westphalian” was subsequently applied to this idea. At the time, this sounded like typical socialist claptrap; for socialists have long been internationalists. But it seems, in hindsight, that it was mostly an attempt to justify Blair’s subsequent warfarism.

International politics shows at its worst, though, in the shape of the European Union and the United Nations. I’ve always been leery of words like “union” and “united” when used in a political sense. For they represent centralization of power, and the suppression of the individual which usually accompanies it. (That goes for “United Kingdom” and “United States,” too). It isn’t in jest that some of my friends refer to the EU as the EUSSR!

Up until about 1991, I thought that the Common Market, or European Economic Community, was generally a good thing. But when I first heard the words “European Union,” my alarm bells went off. What had been sold to us as an economic project, had morphed into something very different; a political federation, with the EU making directives to bind national governments. If the people of Europe had been told this was the objective back in the 1970s or before, I doubt they would have gone along with it. If only because having a third party like the EU making national policies contradicts any idea of “democracy,” which many still believed in back then.

And then there’s the UN. In its first incarnation, as the League of Nations, it may have done some good in its attempts to prevent war, although it ultimately failed. Even in the early days of the UN, some good things were done. The 1948 Declaration on Human Rights, for example, is well intentioned; though I find it like the curate’s egg, mixing genuine rights with socialist claptrap like social security and “free” education. And UN peacekeepers do some useful work in places like Cyprus.

But the UN, like the EU, has morphed into a malign and activist institution. The UN is the main driver of the green and “sustainable development” agenda, which it has been pushing since at least the early 1980s. It extends its tentacles into areas as diverse as loans to developing countries, gender equality and public health. Its activists are unelected and unaccountable. And it harbours many that want to set up a world government; and that want such a government to be strong, monolithic and even, some say, fascistic.

As far as economic globalization goes, a world without trade barriers would be a good thing. And international trade between people of different cultures has the potential to provide a binding force, which can help to hold together humanity as a whole. But what we actually have today is quite different from a truly global economy.

In recent decades, it has become obvious that governments and big companies (national and multi-national) have been colluding. Sometimes they seek to harm foreign competition, other times to hobble smaller competitors closer to home. I have reason to believe that I myself am a victim of just such a collusion. Most often, they seek a political deal in which government and the big companies win, and everyone else loses; like using the climate change agenda to drive electricity prices up. Thus, the prospect of gain through political means corrupts businessmen into becoming cronies of the political class, and doing their dirty work. And the political class reward them handsomely for it.

Migration

I can’t leave the subject of internationalism without a brief discussion of migration. It seems that on this subject there are two main currents of thought, which move towards opposite extremes. On the one hand, some favour maximum freedom of movement for everyone, regardless of race, place of birth, or received culture or religion. On the other hand, there are those who equate a nation with a race, a culture, a region of birth, a religion or some combination of the four. And who, therefore, strongly resist inward migration by those they consider “foreign.”

Myself, I tend towards the former view. For national borders are, in many places, arbitrary. Often, they are no more than accidents of history. And to allow a state a right to control who may go into or out of its territory, and therefore who may meet whom, seems to me an excessive power to give to an organization that has far too much power already.

That said, though, I can understand the feelings of those who see their culture being diluted, and their ties of kinship, proximity or religion washed away, by mass immigration. And most of all when this migration is encouraged or even deliberately planned by the ruling class, for example in an attempt to shore up an unsustainable welfare system. Or when the incomers seem likely to cause substantial change in the demographics, and so in the longer term the culture and values, of a nation. This problem is not, in my view, soluble within the current framework of nation states and democracy. A more radical solution is needed.

The Anti-Enlightenment

Even setting aside philosophical differences between promoters of the Enlightenment, it had enemies from the start. These enemies saw the failure, and the consequences, of the French Revolution as failure of the Enlightenment ideas as a whole. And in the intervening two centuries or so, the anti-Enlightenment backlash has broadened. One aspect of this backlash, in more recent times, has been the movement called postmodernism. This and similar attitudes seem to have profoundly affected many, if not most, of today’s intellectuals and their followers.

I’ll try, as briefly as I can, to contrast the Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment viewpoints.

Where the Enlightenment view sees human minds, and thus human beings, as inherently good, the anti-Enlightenment sees humans as naturally bad and “sinful,” and needing to be restrained. Where the Enlightenment view sees human social and economic progress as natural and desirable, the anti-Enlightenment resists change.

From the Enlightenment point of view, truth is objective. A particular truth or fact may of course be unknown, or poorly understood, or wrongly apprehended, at a particular time. But all truths can, in principle at least, be discovered. In contrast, the anti-Enlightenment view holds that facts can be different for different individuals, groups or cultures; and that feelings are often more important than facts. In this view there is no such thing as objective truth. And thus there can be no way in which people, when they are divided by differences, can agree on anything by argument alone. Ultimately, force is the only possible arbiter.

Where the Enlightenment view celebrates reason, the anti-Enlightenment is skeptical about it. Where Enlightenment people seek to think and behave in ways that are reasonable, those of the anti-Enlightenment seem to want to go out of their way to be unreasonable. Where the Enlightenment view places a high value on science, the anti-Enlightenment corrupts science by trying to mix it with politics.

In ethics, for the Enlightenment thinker, right and wrong ought to be the same for everyone. And any attempt to judge what is right and wrong must be grounded in reason, and backed up by rational arguments. For the anti-Enlightenment thinker, on the other hand, there is no absolute standard of right and wrong. Ethical rules and judgements may be different if looked at from the perspectives of different people. And so, in the extreme, anything goes; and might makes right.

In politics, the Enlightenment point of view is a bottom-up one. Societies exist for the benefit of the individuals in them. All individuals are naturally equal, in John Locke’s sense: “all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.” Tolerance of difference, in religion and in other life choices, is a virtue. And every individual has natural rights and freedoms. In contrast, the anti-Enlightenment view is top-down. It puts Society and the state above the individual. It seeks to centralize power in an élite. It is often intolerant of difference. And it leads, in many cases, to a desire to impose an illiberal agenda on everyone.

This agenda, as I suggested earlier, can’t be classified as any single one of socialist, or communist, or fascist, or conservative. But it combines features of all of them. It is in part socialist or communist, in that it seeks to transform society and societies to accord with the desires of its promoters. Welfarism and hatred of the free market are two aspects of this. But the agenda also has elements of fascism, like warfarism and colluding with cronies. And it is conservative in its hatred of change and human progress, and its devotion to the out of date, failed political system we suffer under today.

In conclusion

So, here’s my best shot at diagnosing the political problems we human beings face today.

First, the nation state, which is currently the primary form of political society, has lost its cohesion. The forces which ought to bind together people in these societies – kinship, community, trade, leadership, religion, proximity, culture – have been weakened by bad politics, and particularly by the sham called democracy. Thus, the nation state has failed as a political system. And the internationalist and globalist schemes like the EU and the UN are, if anything, worse.

Second, many intellectuals and their followers, particularly in academe, the media, government and politics, have acquired a regressive philosophical outlook that rejects the liberal values of the 17th- and 18th-century Enlightenment. This way of thinking leads them to seek to impose on the people of the world an illiberal, totalitarian order that mixes elements of socialism, communism, fascism and conservatism.

How to fix these problems? That’s a matter for another day.

Monday, 7 August 2017

Some thoughts on pacifism

Christian Michel has posed the question: “Is pacifism not only inept, but also morally abhorrent (evil everywhere should always be fought)?”

This question isn’t as simple as it sounds. For a start, my dictionary gives three different meanings of the word “pacifism.” (1) Opposition to war or violence as a means of settling disputes. (2) More specifically, refusal to bear arms on moral or religious grounds. (3) An attitude or policy of non-resistance.

My comment on (1) is that war rarely settles a dispute between nation states. Often, as the loser grows stronger with time, resentment and desire for revenge grow too, and the end result is another war. Thus, this kind of pacifism can be justified on practical grounds, if not also on ethical ones.

As to (2), I think that for an individual to refuse to bear arms in an aggressive war is ethically sound. If a war is wrong, to take part in it is also wrong. However, if the war is defensive, it will often make ethical and practical sense for those capable of it to join in the defence; if only on the grounds that “the devil you know” is probably less evil than the attackers. And so, regrettably, military preparedness will remain necessary, as long as nation states exist.

There are also more difficult cases, such as a war to halt a genocide. So, I won’t try to lay down any hard and fast rules about whether this kind of pacifism is justified or not. Each case can only be decided by each individual, according to the detail of the situation.

As to (3), non-resistance can indeed be an inept response to aggression. For me, both individuals and societies have a right to defend themselves, and to retaliate in proportion where that is necessary. I can see the attraction to some of the idea of “turning the other cheek,” but after you’ve been hit on both cheeks, in the butt and in the wallet, what do you offer next?

I note, in contrast, that there are countries in the world that don’t have militaries. But almost all of them are part of some larger defence federation. Costa Rica may be an exception; but I suspect they have a tacit agreement with the US to defend them if they need it.

So while I (as a libertarian!) agree with a pacifism based on non-aggression, I think that non-resistance, even if it sometimes makes sense for individuals, can’t work for nations.

Which brings me to what I see as the root of the problem. War is built in, at the most fundamental level, to the political system we all suffer under. Jean Bodin, the 16th-century architect of the system that became the nation state, regarded making war as one of the basic rights of sovereignty. (The French have a lot to answer for!) It seems incredible to me that, despite the Enlightenment, and despite bags on the side like parliaments and “democracy,” we’re still using a 16th-century political system that, ultimately, is based on the “divine right of kings.”

So as I see it, if we truly want to be pacifists, we should be exploring and working towards alternative systems of political organization. We should be looking at how to deliver the benefits of good governance, such as peace and objective justice, without any need for “sovereignty” or a state.


Wednesday, 2 August 2017

The Social Costs of Air Pollution from Cars in the UK

(Neil's Note: This is an updated and much re-written version of my previous post "Diesel Fumes.")
Back in April the mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, introduced from the coming October a £10 a day “toxicity charge” for pre 2006 cars, both petrol and diesel, entering the current London congestion charge zone. He also set out plans for a London “Ultra Low Emissions Zone” (ULEZ) [1]. From April 2019 (brought forward from September 2020), it will cost £12.50 per day to drive in this zone a diesel car first registered before September 2015, or a petrol car built before 2006. Furthermore, he plans to extend this zone to the area inside the North and South Circular roads by 2021.

It was also mooted that drivers of diesel cars first registered before September 2015 should be charged to enter any of up to 35 cities around the UK. In some cases, there would also be bans on diesel cars driving into cities at certain times of day. This raised the spectre of greedy, activist, anti-car councils all over the UK imposing arbitrary bans and heavy charges on diesel drivers who enter, or drive within, their areas.

More recently, as reported by the Daily Mail [2], the government has said such measures are intended only as a last resort, only for the dirtiest cars and only when they are actually using the few dozen roads which have been identified as the worst polluted. However, it still isn’t clear what other punitive taxes they are planning in an effort to force people out of diesel cars.

I myself drive a 2011 diesel car. When my previous (petrol) car failed in early 2014, I was looking for a car to keep running at least until 2023 (when I will be 70), and hopefully many years longer. I didn’t intend to or want to buy a diesel. But I couldn’t find a petrol example of the model I wanted. I later found out this was because the manufacturer had made 40 diesel cars of that model for every petrol one. So, as I approach retirement, I’m likely to be stuck with a car I can’t afford to replace, and taxes and charges I can’t afford to pay.

Social cost

My immediate reaction to the proposed schemes was that the charges seemed outrageously high. So, having long ago been trained as a mathematician, I decided to try to calculate the “social cost” of the pollution from cars in the UK, so I could compare it with the proposed charges.

Social cost is the total expense, to all those affected, of the effects of an activity. In the context of pollution, the term is used to mean the total cost of the “externalities” (that is, secondary or unintended consequences) caused by the pollution, and specifically by its effects on health.

In making these calculations, I uncovered some interesting backstory on the issue, some of which may be new to many people. So, my purpose today is twofold. One, to tell the backstory as best I can. And two, to come up with some rough figures of how much people ought to have to pay for the health effects on others of driving their diesel or petrol cars. So, what I’m going to do is work out this social cost, as best I can, as a number of pounds per car per year. And then I’m going to break it down among cars of various ages, according to the emissions standards which were in force at the time they were built.

The players

As in almost any governmental activity, there’s an alphabet soup of agencies involved. Here is a list of the major players in the case.

  • WHO (World Health Organization). This is a United Nations agency, concerned with public health on an international level. It issues “guidelines” which, in matters of air quality, offer global guidance on thresholds and limits for key air pollutants that pose health risks.
  • COMEAP (Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollution). It provides independent advice to UK government departments and agencies on how air pollution impacts on health.
  • DEFRA (Department for Energy, Food and Rural Affairs). Its involvement in the case includes: Reporting on emissions of air pollutants in the UK as a whole. Making calculations on the social costs of pollutants as an input to policy, on the basis of guidelines provided by COMEAP. Providing information to the public on air pollution, limits and targets, and air quality policy.
  • HPA (Health Protection Agency). It produced a significant 2010 report on COMEAP’s behalf.
  • RCP (Royal College of Physicians). Together with the RCPCH (Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health), it produced a 2016 report on the long term effects of air pollution in the UK.
  • LAQN (London Air Quality Network). It reports, since 1993 and normally yearly, on air quality at various sites in inner and outer London, including kerbside, roadside and urban background sites. These reports indicate how well the air quality meets (or not) the limits and targets it is supposed to.
The pollutants

For cars, two pollutants are of interest: particulate matter (PM) and nitrogen oxides (NOx).
Adverse health effects from PM come mainly from one kind of PM, called PM2.5. These are particles smaller than 2.5 micrometres. The calculations made by COMEAP and the HPA regarding the health effects of PM have all concentrated on PM2.5.

As to nitrogen oxides, the generic term NOx means a combination of two oxides of nitrogen, nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Since NO rapidly oxidizes to NO2, measuring it is done, in effect, by measuring NO2. Hence, in the context of air pollution, the terms NOx and NO2 are often used interchangeably.

Air quality limits and targets

In the UK, air quality standards are the province of DEFRA [3]. According to DEFRA, “Action to manage and improve air quality is largely driven by European (EU) legislation. The 2008 ambient air quality directive… sets legally binding limits for concentrations in outdoor air of major air pollutants that impact public health.” The 2008 directive was incorporated into English law in 2010, around the time of the change of government from Labour to the Coalition.

The standards are supposed to be “acceptable in terms of what is scientifically known about the effects of each pollutant on health and the environment.” Broadly, there are Limits and Targets. Limits are “legally binding EU parameters that must not be exceeded.” Targets are “to be attained where possible by taking all necessary measures not entailing disproportionate costs.” For the pollutants of interest, they are specified as annual concentration means, or as the mean over a period of time within a day, with an allowed number of exceedences.

Emissions standards

The EU sets emissions standards for vehicles for both PM and NOx [4]. UK standards have generally been kept in line with EU ones.

Every five years or so, the EU makes new, tighter standards. The vast majority of cars now on the road in the UK were required to be built to one of four standards: Euro 3 (applies to cars built since 2001), Euro 4 (since 2006), Euro 5 (since September 2010) and Euro 6 (since September 2015).

For PM, the limits to be met by diesel cars have been successively reduced. Thus, Euro 5 and 6 diesels produce only a tenth as much PM as Euro 3 ones. For petrol cars, no limit was set until Euro 5, and this only applies to cars with direct injection engines (and is the same as the limit for diesels of the same year).

For NOx, the standards for both petrol and diesel cars have also been tightened between Euro 3 and Euro 6. Of course, for diesels this is somewhat moot, since it’s now clear that most diesel cars don’t actually meet, in the real world, the NOx limits they were supposedly designed for.

Half a century of progress

DEFRA produce each year a statistics release on emissions of air pollutants in the UK over that period. This covers pollution from all sources, not just cars. The latest report [5], published in December 2016, covers the period up to 2015.

As the graph on page 2 of the report shows, progress in reducing air pollution in the UK over the period of almost half a century since 1970 has been most impressive. Levels of PM2.5 in 2015 were less than a quarter of what they had been in 1970, and levels of NOx less than a third. And I don’t remember the air being badly polluted back in 1970, at least not where I lived. Haven’t we done well? Which prompts the question: having done so well, why should we be expected to make any more sacrifices?

Reports, Reports, Reports

There are five UK reports, on which I’ve based my calculations. I’ve put them in chronological order. If you’re not interested in the gory detail, you can skip to the next section, as I’ve included brief summaries and some headline quotes from the documents below.
  • COMEAP, “Long-Term Exposure to Air Pollution: Effect on Mortality,” 2009 [6].
  • HPA (on behalf of COMEAP), “The Mortality Effects of Long-Term Exposure to Particulate Air Pollution in the United Kingdom,” 2010 [7].
  • DEFRA, “Valuing impacts on air quality: Updates in valuing changes in emissions of Oxides of Nitrogen (NOX) and concentrations of Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2),” September 2015 [8].
  • COMEAP, “Interim Statement on Quantifying the Association of Long-Term Average Concentrations of Nitrogen Dioxide and Mortality,” December 2015 [9]. This included a copy of the recommendations COMEAP previously made to DEFRA in July 2015.
  • RCP and RCPCH, “Every breath we take: the lifelong impact of air pollution,” February 2016 [10].
Early Deaths and Mortality Costs

Most people will have heard sound bites like “23,500 early deaths a year” caused by the “toxic fumes” of nitrogen oxides. Or even 40,000. But this doesn’t mean at all that each year there are 40,000, or even 23,500, corpses with death certificates that say “Killed by pollution from diesel cars”. Rather, calculations suggest that of the people who died in a given year (in this case 2013), about 23,500 had lost a certain fraction of their lives due to NOx pollution from all sources. That fraction turns out to be about 11.7 years on average. This can equally well be put as a loss of life expectancy from birth, for everyone, of a little less than five months.

To match that 23,500 figure, DEFRA give a social cost figure of £13.3 billion. Big scary number, heh? Dividing out, I get £566,000 per death caused by pollution.

I haven’t found any document justifying this number of £13.3 billion. Some seem to think it only includes the effects of the pollution on those who die of it, not on everyone. (In technical terms, only “mortality,” not “morbidity”). But looking at reports from as far back as 2004, it seems that DEFRA do aim to include both lethal and non-lethal health effects in their calculations. And they use the term “social cost” without qualifying it to say that it includes some costs but not others.

The backstory on PM

I’ll deal with PM first. Not only because it was the first of the two pollutants to be investigated in terms of health effects, but also because the backstory is less controversial, and the calculation less convoluted, than for NOx.

Following the 1992 Rio summit, attention was directed for the first time at trying to quantify the health effects of long term exposure to air pollution. A major study on PM2.5 was carried out in the USA on behalf of the American Cancer Society in about 1995, and updated in 2002.

The 2009 COMEAP report

The first UK specific report on the matter was produced in 2009 by COMEAP [6]. Broadly, they agreed that the approach used in the 2002 US study was applicable in the UK too. They set out to estimate the value of the “risk coefficient” which should be used. (The risk coefficient is the percentage chance of death from a pollutant for a given unit of change of concentration. In this case, the unit of concentration was 10 micrograms per cubic metre). They agreed that the risk coefficient suggested by the US study, 6 per cent (also sometimes stated as a “relative risk” of 1.06) would also be appropriate as the best estimate of the risk in the UK.

However, they were unsure about the level of confidence that ought to be placed on this estimate, as it appeared that standard statistical methods could not be used. They therefore used a novel method they called “expert elicitation.” Seven experts each made judgements on how likely they thought the risk coefficient was to be above each number from zero to 17 per cent. The results were pooled, and they concluded that the uncertainty in the risk estimate was so high that the true value of the coefficient could be anywhere between 1 per cent and 12 per cent. And even the chance of it being inside that range was only three-quarters.

As you can see from the numbers on page 157 of the report, the experts came up with wildly different ideas. One, expert A, gave almost every percentage the same chance. In other words, he was saying “I have no idea at all what the true risk value may be”. At the opposite extreme, expert D reckoned there was a 50 per cent chance of the value being less than 1 per cent. That’s an order of magnitude lower than the “consensus” estimate of 6 per cent.

So, there is very little certainty in this report’s central estimate. There is a factor of 12 between the upper and lower bounds! Imagine if a businessman asked one of his staff to estimate the cost of a project so he could work out whether to go ahead with it or not, and got the answer “between £1 million and £12 million.” Or if an engineer wanted to know how big a plug he needed to stop a particular gap, and was told “between an inch and a foot.” And yet numbers with such wide error bounds, it seems, are considered good enough for social engineering. They are seen as good enough for making political policies which will severely affect, and if got wrong will unjustly hurt, millions of people. They’re “good enough for government work.”

The 2010 HPA report

The next report was produced in 2010, on COMEAP’s behalf, by the HPA [7]. This used the figures from the earlier COMEAP report to derive specific estimates of mortality rates due to PM2.5. The headline conclusion was:
“An effect on mortality in 2008 of nearly 29,000 deaths in the UK at typical ages and an associated loss of total population life of 340,000 life-years. The burden can also be represented as a loss of life expectancy from birth of approximately six months.”
To their credit, the HPA went out of their way to make it clear that this did not mean 29,000 death certificates with “PM2.5” as cause of death. At one extreme, it meant that 29,000 people who died in 2008 could be considered to have lost on average 11.7 years of their lifespan due to the effects of PM2.5. At the other, it meant that everyone in the population would on average have their life expectancy lowered by about six months due to these effects.

The HPA were also careful to stress the huge uncertainty in COMEAP’s risk estimate. They said:
“Using the 75% plausibility interval suggested by the expert elicitation in COMEAP (2009) this means a range of effects on mortality equivalent to 4,700–51,000 deaths with a loss of 55,000–597,000 years of life in 2008, or effects on average life expectancy of between 1 month and one year, for England and Wales.”
The formula they used

I reverse engineered the calculation the HPA did for 2008 mortality due to PM2.5 in the UK as a whole, using the data on pages 61 and 65-67 of their report. This is the formula I think they used:

D = D_0 × (R/(1+R)) × (C/U)

Here, D_0 is the total deaths in the population aged 30 and over (568,680). R is the risk coefficient (6% or 0.06). C is the actual concentration of the pollutant (8.97 micrograms per cubic metre), and U is the unit of concentration for which the risk coefficient is estimated (10 micrograms per cubic metre). When I plug these numbers into the equation, I get a figure for D of 28,874, against the HPA’s 28,861. The difference, I think, is explained by the HPA having used in their calculation a more accurate value of the concentration (8.966 rather than 8.97) than the rounded one they gave in the report.

It struck me that there is a less sensationalist, and perhaps more informative, way to express this number than in deaths per year. The fraction

D / D_0 = (R/(1+R)) × (C/U)

represents the proportion of all deaths in the year, of those who died aged 30 or older, which can be attributed to this specific cause. Using the HPA’s figures for UK wide PM2.5 in 2008, this comes out as just over 5 per cent (to three significant figures, 5.08%). So it’s possible to re-state the “29,000 deaths” meme as: “Among people who died aged 30 or older in 2008, just over 5 per cent died as a result of long term exposure to air pollution by particulate matter.”

It’s also worthy of note that the equation is linear in the concentration, C. As I understand from the HPA report, this is OK for small values of the concentration, where C is smaller than, or not much greater than, the unit U. But it wouldn’t be correct, for example, to calculate the figure for 1970, when PM2.5 levels were four times those in 2008, as four times the above, and so to say “over 20 per cent of deaths over age 30 in 1970 were due to particulate matter pollution.” I’d be interested to know what COMEAP and HPA think was the percentage of deaths attributable to PM back in 1970.

A sanity check

I always like to sanity check my results by comparing with figures calculated in different ways from different sources. So, I looked at a WHO fact sheet [11]: “Ambient air quality and health.”

It gives an estimate of 3 million premature deaths world-wide caused by air pollution of all types in 2012. It also says that 92 per cent of the world population live in places where the WHO’s air quality guidelines are not met. Now the UK’s population in 2012 was 0.9 per cent of the world population. So if the UK was average in pollution among all countries, we would expect about 27,000 of these deaths to be in the UK. But we know that the UK does meet the guidelines for all pollutants except NOx; it’s in the least polluted 8 per cent of the world. So either the WHO’s number is low, or the HPA’s 29,000 for 2008 – and that’s for PM2.5 on its own! – is over the top.

The per-car social cost of PM from diesels

To work out the social cost of PM pollution per diesel car per year as at 2008, I needed to find out some more numbers.
  • The fraction of PM2.5 emissions attributable to road transport in 2008 – 24 per cent, from [12].
  • The fraction of these emissions attributable to diesel cars as opposed to other diesel forms of transport. (I assumed that PM emissions from petrol engines were negligible compared to diesels). In a National Statistics fact sheet on fuel consumption [13], I found a graph of fuel consumption by vehicle types for a number of years, including 2008. This shows that diesel car fuel usage, and so presumably emissions, were one third of the total for diesels.
  • The number of diesel cars on UK roads in 2008 – 7.16 million, from spreadsheet VEH0203 at [14].
I was now ready to calculate the social cost per car for emissions of PM from diesel cars as at 2008. It came out to £183 per car per year. So, if the numbers going in to my calculation are accurate, the problem of PM pollution from diesel cars was real back in 2008.

Apportioning PM costs from diesels between Euro standards

Next, I needed to apportion this cost of £183 between cars of different ages. In 2008, Euro 4 was the newest standard, having been in force since January 2006. I used spreadsheet VEH0207 at [14] to calculate how many of the cars on the UK roads were less than three years old in 2008. I assumed that the proportions for diesel cars were roughly the same as for all cars. I also assumed that the cars older than Euro 4 were, on average, meeting the Euro 3 standard. Dividing the social cost between these in proportion to the PM levels allowed by the standards, gave a social cost per car per year of £207 for Euro 3 and £103 for Euro 4 cars. And, as Euro 5 marked a five-fold decrease in the PM limit, with no further decrease for Euro 6, the social cost per car per year came out to £21 for both Euro 5 and Euro 6.

Note that these social cost figures don’t depend on which year the data came from. As long as it keeps to the same standards it was originally built to, the contribution of any individual car to the social cost, ignoring inflation, will remain the same from one year to the next.

The backstory on NOx

Now, it’s time to look at NOx. The history is chequered. It begins in 2001, when prime minister Tony Blair, chancellor Gordon Brown and chief science adviser David King decided to offer incentives to drivers to buy diesel cars. They did this, supposedly, because diesel engines emit less carbon dioxide (CO2) per mile than petrol ones, and so were expected to cause less putative “global warming!”

By early 2006, a problem was becoming apparent. Insiders at the European Federation for Transport and Environment [15] had found out that, in the “real world” as opposed to laboratory testing, emissions of NOx from diesel engines were much higher than the emissions limits the cars were supposedly built to meet.

And this had effects on measured air quality, too. The LAQN’s report for 2006 and 2007 [16] – which, curiously, wasn’t published until 2009 – stated that the EU limit value for NO2 was being “consistently exceeded at background sites in inner London and at roadside sites throughout London.” And that the increases: “are thought to be due to changes in diesel vehicle technologies ... and an increase in the proportion of diesel vehicles on London’s roads.”

More curiously still, the LAQN report for 2008 wasn’t published until November 2012. In contrast to earlier reports, it was slim. It had no management summary, had only raw data with very little accompanying text, and drew no conclusions. The 2009 and 2010 reports followed during the next month. It’s hard to avoid the suspicion that Gordon Brown, the prime minister in 2009/10 and one of the architects of the diesel scheme, had the original 2008 report suppressed. And that the Coalition either didn’t find out about it, or continued to suppress it, until 2012.

In early 2014, the NOx problem became “official,” with a court case brought against the UK by the European Commission [17].

In July 2015, COMEAP issued guidelines to DEFRA on how to estimate the mortality associated with NOx pollution. These are attached to reference [9]. They suggested a risk coefficient of 2.5 per cent, with a range of uncertainty from 1 per cent to 4 per cent. I haven’t found any document justifying these numbers, so I can’t assess how good or bad they might be.

COMEAP also suggested that this coefficient should be reduced by up to 33 per cent when calculating NOx health effects in conjunction with PM, to avoid double counting. They also made a caveat: “there is uncertainty in the extent to which the association between long-term average concentrations of NO2 and mortality is causal.” So, the science is not “settled” at all!

In September 2015, DEFRA issued their report on NOx [8]. The bottom line, for NOx alone and based on 2013 data, was a central estimate of 23,500 deaths and a £13.3 billion social cost. This is the source of the 23,500 deaths figure you hear in the media. The ranges were from 9,500 deaths to 38,000.

Around the same time, September 2015, the Volkswagen diesel scandal erupted in the USA. The fact that many diesels failed to meet the emissions standards they were supposed to have been built to – known to insiders as early as 2006 – became public knowledge for the first time.

In December 2015, COMEAP issued revised guidelines [9]. They said that the combined effects of PM2.5 and NOx together might not be any greater than the effects of PM2.5 or NOx calculated individually. Meaning, that the overlap factor by which one result should be reduced, before it can be added to the other, would be higher than the 33 per cent they had previously reported, and might be as high as 100 per cent. They also admitted that their previous figures of mortality effects of PM2.5 were probably over-estimated.

The RCP report

In February 2016, the RCP and RCPCH published their report [10]. The chair of the RCP’s working group, Stephen Holgate of Southampton University, was also on the panel that produced the COMEAP report back in 2009. (I wonder which of the seven experts he was?) And the vice chair, Jonathan Grigg, was quoted in the mayor of London’s press release [1]: “To maximise the effectiveness of this initiative, the Government must now act to remove the current toxic fleet of diesel cars, vans and buses from all our roads.”

Even the title of this report is alarmist. It has a general tone of rampant greenism and nanny-statism. And it includes the phrase “climate change” more than 70 times. This is zealotry, not science.

The bottom line paragraph in this report goes as follows:
“When quantifying the total impact associated with exposure to both NO2 and PM2.5, it is therefore necessary to account for this overlap in the response functions. Defra estimates that the annual equivalent number of attributable deaths associated with the two pollutants combined is 44,750–52,500, with an associated annual social cost of £25.3 billion – £29.7 billion. However, a subsequent paper issued by COMEAP in December 2015 indicates that the level of overlap in estimates between pollutants may be greater than originally thought. On this basis, while recognising that COMEAP’s research on this issue is continuing, this report adopts a combined estimate of effect of around 40,000 deaths annually with an associated annual social cost of £22.6 billion (both with a range for a central estimate of ±25%).”
That’s where the headline-grabbing figure of 40,000 deaths came from. For the overlap factor, they have reduced the NOx deaths figure, before adding the two together, by a little more than half. And the reduction in the risk coefficient is also a little more than half. This is plausible, given COMEAP’s advice. But the range given, ±25%, is way less than the error bounds in the numbers we started with – a factor of 12 for PM and a factor of 4 for NOx. That can’t be right.

The per-car social cost of NOx

The calculation for NOx is made harder than the one for PM by three things. First, DEFRA’s deaths figure is based on 2013 data, not 2008. As I don’t have numbers for 2013 on emissions from different types of transport, I’ll have to move my window to a different year. So I’ll use a year, 2015, for which I do have the data I need to complete the calculation. Second, petrol cars emit a significant amount of NOx. So their share has to be taken into account. And third, I want to estimate the cost of the manufacturers’ failure to build their diesel cars to the standards they were supposed to meet. So I’ll need to do the diesel calculations twice over: once with real world emission levels, and once with the values from the standards.

The first step is to move DEFRA’s deaths figure of 23,500 from 2013 to its equivalent in 2015. NOx levels in 2015 were roughly 11 per cent lower than they had been in 2013. But the total number of deaths of people aged 30 or older increased from 2013 to 2015 by about 4.6 per cent [18]. So the equivalent deaths figure for 2015 comes out to 21,883, to the nearest individual.

Now, the other numbers I need:
  • The fraction of all NOx emissions attributable to road transport in 2015 – 34 per cent, from [5].
  • The fraction of road transport NOx emissions attributable to diesel cars in 2015. In the recent air quality plan [19], produced jointly by DEFRA and the Department of Transport, I found a pie chart of emissions from different sources in 2015 (Figure 3a). Eyeball and protractor measured the sector for diesel cars as 34.4 per cent of all NOx emitted by road traffic.
  • The fraction of road transport NOx emissions attributable to petrol cars in 2015. This is shown in the same pie chart as the diesel emissions. It’s 8.1 per cent.
  • The number of diesel and petrol cars on UK roads in 2015 – VEH0203 at [14] gives 11.4 million and 18.5 million respectively.
Cranking the handle of the calculator, I get £127 per car per year as the social cost of NOx emissions from all diesel cars, and £18 for all petrol cars.

Apportioning NOx costs from diesel cars between Euro standards

Next, I need the numbers of diesel cars on the roads in 2015 that were (supposedly) built to each of the Euro standards. I found these in a working paper produced by the RAC [20]. Happily, the same table also shows estimates of actual NOx emissions for each category. Happier yet, they match the numbers shown in the air quality plan [19].

I calculated the following social costs of NOx from diesel cars, per car per year, broken down by Euro standard:
StandardSocial cost of real world emissionsSocial cost if cars met their standardsSocial cost due to manufacturer fault%age due to manufacturer fault
Euro 3£158£79£7950.0%
Euro 4£127£40£8768.7%
Euro 5£127£29£9877.5%
Euro 6£95£13£8286.7%

Apportioning NOx costs from petrol cars between Euro standards

For petrol cars, I don’t have figures on the distribution of the cars among Euro standards. So I’ll have to assume that the proportions are roughly similar to diesels. The calculated social costs, per car per year, are: Euro 3 £33, Euro 4 £18, Euro 5 and Euro 6 £13.

Putting PM and NOx figures together

Here, I hit a problem. COMEAP recommend that the risk coefficient (and thus, approximately, the deaths figure and so the social cost) from one pollutant should be reduced by an overlap factor before adding it to the other. But it makes a difference whether you calculate PM first and then adjust the NOx figure (as COMEAP initially recommended) or calculate NOx first and then adjust the PM, or use coefficients each adjusted for the other pollutant. With a range of figures like mine, I think the third method would be the most appropriate. But I don’t know the values of those coefficients. So, I decided to take a simple approach, and to apply the same overlap factor to the estimates for both pollutants. That is, I’ll simply add up the two figures and then multiply by 40,000/52,500 (approximately 76.2 per cent) as suggested by the deaths figures quoted in the RCP report.

The results are as follows:
StandardSocial cost of real world emissionsExcess over 2017 car of same typeSocial cost if cars met their standardsDriver excess over 2017 petrolSocial cost due to manufacturer fault%age of total due to manufacturer fault
Euro 3 diesel£278£190£218£205£6021.6%
Euro 4 diesel£175£87£109£96£6637.7%
Euro 5 diesel£113£25£38£25£7566.4%
Euro 6 diesel£88N/A£26£13£6270.5%
Euro 3 petrol£33£20£20
Euro 4 petrol£18£5£5
Euro 5 petrol£13£0£0
Euro 6 petrol£13N/AN/A

The “excess over 2017 car of same type” column shows the difference in the social cost of real world emissions between a car built to one standard and a new car of the same type. The “driver excess over 2017 petrol” column (bolded) shows the difference in social cost between a diesel or petrol car built to one standard and a new petrol car, if the diesel cars had met the standards they were supposed to.

What do my figures imply?

To return to where I came in, the over the top level of proposed entry charges to London.

If I can believe the central estimates for both pollutants, there is a case to be made for charging drivers of Euro 3, and perhaps Euro 4, diesels a fee to drive in areas that are especially badly affected by air pollution. But there is no case, on social cost grounds, for such charges on Euro 5 diesels or on any petrol cars. For all these cars, the excess of the social cost of the pollution they emit, compared to a new (Euro 6) car of the same type, is £25 a year or less. Two entry fees to the London ULEZ would cover the social cost of this pollution for a whole year. To levy such outrageous charges on drivers of these cars (including me) is unreasonable.

Further, since new diesel cars have a higher social cost of pollution than Euro 3 petrol cars, the question must be asked why Euro 3 petrol cars are to be charged, and Euro 6 diesels not. If the aim was, as claimed, to reduce NOx levels quickly and so meet the EU limit, then drivers of even brand new diesel cars should have been charged. It’s hard to avoid the thought that the decision on who to charge for entry to the ULEZ, and who not, was arbitrary and political.

On a longer term basis, there is a case to be made for some kind of pollution charge for diesels; and perhaps for Euro 3 petrol cars. But it should not be more than the difference between the social costs per year of these cars and of a new Euro 6 petrol car. Furthermore, diesel drivers should not be penalized for the part of the cost which is down to the manufacturers’ fault; and most of all for Euro 5 and 6 diesels, where the manufacturers’ component is more than two-thirds of the total social cost. So, on social cost grounds, no-one should be charged more than the figures in the “Driver excess over 2017 petrol” column in my table above. If the new taxes, when they are announced, are any bigger than this, we’ll know we’ve been had. Again.

And let’s not forget the uncertainty in the figures. The true impacts of the pollution might easily be a quarter, or even less, of the figures I used. What if that turns out to have been the case? Millions of drivers will have suffered huge, unnecessary costs, and the unlucky will have lost their personal mobility entirely. And some of them may have lost their livelihoods as a result. If that happens, who will pay for the fiasco?

Life Expectancy

It’s interesting to follow up on the HPA’s estimates of life expectancy. Their worst case is 203 days of life expectancy lost due to all forms of PM pollution in 2008. This equates to about 16 days of loss caused by PM from diesel cars. However, I want to work with the year I did the NOx calculations for, 2015. So I need to adjust this to take account of the generally cleaner vehicle fleet in 2015 compared with 2008. This brings it down to 11 days.

The loss of life expectancy due to NOx alone will be in proportion to the number of deaths figure from NOx. Thus the loss of life expectancy due to NOx emissions from diesel and petrol cars combined is 22 days. Adding the numbers together and multiplying by the overlap factor gives an average loss of life expectancy due to air pollution from cars, at 2015 levels, of 25 days.

Which would you prefer? To travel where you want, when you want, in the comfort and privacy of a fast, smooth, quiet, spacious car? Or to be granted an extra 25 days at the end of your life, and in exchange to be forced to spend your travelling life waiting at bus stops in the pouring rain or standing on freezing station platforms, and when you finally do get moving it’s noisy, rattling, uncomfortable, crowded and often slow? I know which I’d pick. Moreover, wouldn’t you spend a lot more than 25 days of your life at those bus stops and on those platforms? (Exercise for the reader: how many days is 5 minutes a day over a lifetime?)

The political backstory

To grasp how this sad and sorry situation came about, it’s necessary first to understand two things. One, that the United Nations, of which the WHO is an agency, is the force behind the world-wide environmentalist agenda, which is the cause of so much pain to ordinary people in the Western world. And two, that the UN has been pushing this agenda for more than 30 years. For those interested in the backstory behind the backstory, I myself have documented [21] the history of the 1987 UN report that set the green juggernaut rolling, and led to the 1992 Rio summit and all that has happened since.

If you read further into the WHO fact sheet [11] I referenced earlier, you will find a list of policies they recommend to reduce air pollution. Such as: Making us walk, cycle or use public transport instead of cars. Cramming us into compact cities and high-rises. Recycling as a religion. Dismantling our affordable, reliable energy infrastructure, and replacing it by energy that is expensive, intermittent and requires gigantic solar arrays or ugly, noisy wind farms. That’s the deep green agenda. It’s not designed for our benefit, is it?

And if you think that “fixing” the immediate problem of NOx emissions from diesel cars will get the so called “green blob” off our backs, think again. For example, for PM2.5 the EU (and so UK) limit today is two and a half times the WHO guideline set back in 2006. There will surely be pressure to drive that limit down. But as reported by the LAQN, in 2015 no sites in London, which could reliably make the measurement, actually met this guideline limit.

This is not about solving a problem and then getting on with our lives. It’s about an agenda. Something I noticed about the HPA report is that much of it is concerned, not with the burden of PM pollution as it was at the time, but with the effects of changes to, and especially reductions of, the concentration. This is, in my opinion, cart before horse. Rationally, the first question to ask should be, “How big is the problem?” And only when you have a good handle on that can you sensibly ask, “What might we do to fix it?” It’s as if the agenda was already predetermined, and the HPA were simply told to fit in with it.

That agenda was hammered out in the late 1980s, and agreed by politicians from most countries, including the UK, at the 1992 Rio summit. John Major was prime minister at the time. They were setting out to transform Western societies, and the world as a whole, into a utopian model of so called “sustainable development.” The narcissistic politicians and their cronies wanted the fame and glory of “saving the planet.” And it didn’t matter how much the little people suffered. So, in came Guidelines and Directives and Limits and Targets, and all the paraphernalia of the system under which we suffer today. And bad laws were made, which should never have even been contemplated. Bad laws which, as Edmund Burke told us, are the worst sort of tyranny.

The whole idea of setting hard, inflexible, ever tightening collective limits on what people may do is madness. As is the idea, that such limits should be set without any concern for cost-effectiveness. Most of all, it is madness even to try to set such limits when the underlying science isn’t fully understood. If COMEAP, who are supposed to be the experts, can’t accurately calculate the toxicity of the mixtures of pollutants that exist in the real world, and can’t even estimate the toxicity of PM2.5 on its own to better than a factor of 12, how can someone at the WHO, or at the EU, or at DEFRA possibly claim a right to set hard limits for concentrations?

Perhaps, in the heady atmosphere of the build up to Rio, Major and his cohorts failed to detect the zealotry of those pushing the deep green agenda. Or perhaps they may have, at least in part, bought into the agenda themselves. Or perhaps going along with it just seemed like a good idea at the time. But they were wrong, I think, to sign up to the Rio agreements. And that is the root cause of all these problems. Furthermore, to sign up to the idea of hard EU or WHO limits on air pollution was wrong too. If nothing else, allowing UK policies to be set by third parties – and third parties with agendas, to boot – is a denial of democracy.

Blair, Brown and King were wrong to encourage diesels, too. Not so much because of the pollution aspect, but because their push to reduce CO2 emissions was (and still is) based, as anyone who has looked hard and objectively at the facts will know, on no more than bad “science,” hype and skullduggery. If Brown or others had LAQN reports suppressed, that was wrong as well. The car manufacturers were wrong to hide for so long their failure to meet diesel emissions standards in the real world. If, as I suspect is possible, they were pressured into that position by the EU, that was wrong too. And we drivers are to be expected to make enormous sacrifices, both financially and in convenience, for the sake of bailing out those that have done these things to us? That’s about as wrong, wrong, wrong as you can get.

How pollution might be dealt with in a sane world

I’ll make it clear at this point that I’m not at all advocating that people should be allowed to pollute air, water or other common resources exactly as they want to. In fact, I entirely agree with the principle of “polluter pays.” Those responsible for the pollution – and that includes politicians like Blair and Brown, and their advisers – should pay for its consequences to those who are harmed by it. This is a particular case of the general idea of personal responsibility; that people, who unjustly cause damage to others, have a responsibility to compensate those affected.

The problem of pollution is an example of a case where one group of people – I’ll call them A – wants to do an activity X, which brings great benefits to them. However, it has side-effects which have negative consequences for another group of people, B. Here’s an idea for how I think such problems might be dealt with in a world saner than today’s.

First, you must get an objective, accurate estimate of the social cost of X. Plus or minus 10 per cent would be reasonable. If the cost of X to group B is so big that it outweighs the benefits to A, there may be a case for prohibiting X entirely. (That’s not the case here, of course). Otherwise, you apportion the social cost of X according to how much of the problem each individual is responsible for. That’s what I’ve been aiming to do here, by calculating costs per car per year.

Then you need to apportion the costs borne by group B among the members of B. In the case of air pollution from cars, this might be based on where an individual lives, and how close to badly polluted main roads. Then you simply require each individual in A to pay the relevant fraction of the cost, and pass the relevant fraction to each member of B.

In such a scheme, once the costs and compensations have been assigned, government acts as no more than a router. All it does is make sure the right amounts are collected from the right people, and the right amounts are distributed to the right people. There are no political policies in such a scheme, no arbitrary limits which must not be exceeded, and no infringements of freedom.

In conclusion

If my figures are right, then on the specific issue of air pollution from cars in the UK, there may be a case for charging drivers of Euro 3 and perhaps Euro 4 diesel cars to enter certain very limited areas like central London. There is no social cost case for any such charges for Euro 5 or 6 diesels, or for any petrol cars. There is a case for charging drivers of diesels, and of petrol cars which do not meet the latest standard, an amount equivalent to the social cost of the pollution they cause (excluding the part of the pollution from diesels which is the manufacturer’s fault). There is no case for charging any more than this.

But there’s a much wider issue behind all this. Car drivers today, and diesel drivers in particular, are victims of a sequence of collusions and wrongdoings, which stretches back more than 30 years. All this comes, ultimately, from an agenda that was hatched, and has been pushed forward, by the United Nations. And which most politicians and too many others in government, egged on by extremist cheerleaders like Greenpeace and their fellow travellers in academe and the media, have been all too happy to lend their weight to. Without any regard for the negative consequences on the people they are supposed to serve.

It is high time, I think, for the good people of the UK and of the world to wake up. To see the deep green agenda for what it is. To reject it and its proponents. And to seek to set up in its place just measures based on good science, honesty and common sense.


Links:
[1] https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/mayor-plans-to-introduce-ulez-in-april-2019
[2] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4730134/All-petrol-diesel-cars-banned-2040.html
[3] https://uk-air.defra.gov.uk/air-pollution/uk-eu-limits
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_emission_standards
[5] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/579200/Emissions_airpollutants_statisticalrelease_2016_final.pdf
[6] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/304667/COMEAP_long_term_exposure_to_air_pollution.pdf
[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/comeap-mortality-effects-of-long-term-exposure-to-particulate-air-pollution-in-the-uk
[8] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/460401/air-quality-econanalysis-nitrogen-interim-guidance.pdf
[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nitrogen-dioxide-interim-view-on-long-term-average-concentrations-and-mortality
[10] https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/every-breath-we-take-lifelong-impact-air-pollution
[11] http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/
[12] https://uk-air.defra.gov.uk/assets/documents/reports/cat07/1009030925_2008_Report_final270805.pdf
[13] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/sub-national-road-transport-fuel-consumption-2011-factsheet
[14] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/veh02-licensed-cars
[15] https://www.transportenvironment.org/docs/Bulletin/2006/2006-02_bulletin146_web.pdf
[16] https://www.londonair.org.uk/london/asp/reportdetail.asp?ReportID=lar2006&ReportType=All
[17] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-154_en.htm
[18] https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/datasets/the21stcenturymortalityfilesdeathsdataset
[19] https://consult.defra.gov.uk/airquality/air-quality-plan-for-tackling-nitrogen-dioxide/supporting_documents/Draft%20Revised%20AQ%20Plan.pdf
[20] http://www.racfoundation.org/assets/rac_foundation/content/downloadables/Diesel_scrappage_scheme_calculation_Al_PG_Final_March_11_2016.pdf
[21] https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/04/20/our-common-future-revisited-how-did-the-roadmap-for-the-green-juggernaut-fare-over-30-years/